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Abstract
This Note will examine decisions from two of the potential transfer cases, Prosecutor v.
Gaspard Kanyarukiga and Prosecutor v.YussufMunyakazi, and discuss their implications for the
ICTR.” Part I addresses the early history of the ICTR, including the initial criticisms leveled against
it and its rocky relationship with Rwanda. It also examines the introduction of 11 bis and the
changes made by Rwanda to come into compliance with the Rule’s requirements. Part II discusses
the referral decisions themselves. Finally, Part III assesses the different approaches taken by the
two chambers within their respective denials. Through an examination of the reasons given in
each decision, this Note will highlight the apparent confusion within the ICTR as to the level of
trust which should be afforded to Rwanda. It ultimately argues that the ICTR must give Rwanda
greater leeway within its 11 bis decisions, both to underscore the Tribunal’s own legitimacy and
assist with Rwanda’s growth as a nation. It nevertheless recognizes that Rwanda faces certain, potentially insurmountable, problems in guaranteeing a fair trial, problems to which the ICTR cannot
afford to turn a blind eye. Although the chambers hold out the possibility of a future transfer if
their concerns are addressed, there is a very real possibility that Rwanda cannot fix the highlighted
problems. In the face of such an impasse, one is ultimately left questioning whether the ICTR is
promising the impossible.

NOTES
"FOR THESE REASONS, THE CHAMBER: DENIES THE
PROSECUTOR'S REQUEST FOR REFERRAL": THE
FALSE HOPE OF RULE 11 BIS
Amelia S. Canter$
INTRODUCTION
In December 2007, the Government of Rwanda ("GOR")
submitted an amicus curiae brief to the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"), respectfully requesting that one of the Tribunal's defendants, Yussuf Munyakazi, be transferred to Kigali for trial.' Prior to the 1994
Rwandan genocide, Munyakazi had been a prominent businessman and commercial farmer in Kigali.2 When violence erupted,
* J.D. Candidate, 2010, Fordham University School of Law; A.B., 2007, Harvard
College. The author would like to thank Nicole Fritz, Annie Chen and the editors of
the FordhamInternationalLaw Journalfor their insightful comments and guidance. This
Note is dedicated to my parents, a small token of my appreciation for their unwavering
support, patience and love.
1. Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R1 Ibis, Amicus CuriaeBrief
of the Republic of Rwanda in the Matter of an Application for the Referral of the above
case to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11 bis (Dec. 21, 2007) [hereinafter "Munyakazi
Rwanda Brief"], cited in Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-Rl 1bis,
Decision on the Prosecutor's Request for Referral of Case to the Republic of Rwanda,
5 n.6 (May 28, 2008) [hereinafter "Munyakazi Trial Decision"] (requesting that Yussuf
Munyakazi be transferred to Rwanda for trial pursuant to Rule 11 bis); see also Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-RI I bis, Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of the case of Yussuf Munyakazi pursuant to Rule I Ibis of the Tribunal's Rules of
Procedure and Evidence (Sept. 7, 2007) [hereinafter "Munyakazi Referral Request"],
cited in Munyakazi Trial Decision,
1 n.1 (requesting that Yussuf Munyakazi be transferred to Rwanda for trial pursuant to Rule 11 bis); see also Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-R1 Ibis, Amicus Curiae Brief on Behalf of the Government of
Rwanda,
1 (Jul. 28, 2008) [hereinafter "Munyakazi Rwanda Appellate Brief'] Within
its appellate amicus brief, the Government of Rwanda ("GOR") states that it:
[I]s prepared to receive the first transfer case. The structures and procedures
are in place and in many respects have been tested. The GOR is unquestionably committed to fulfilling its international obligations to deliver justice fairly,
mindful that the proceedings will be closely monitored. The GOR, thus, respectfully requests the Appeals Chamber to order the transfer of this case,
together with any other orders it deems appropriate.
Id. 26.
2. Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 12 (noting that "[t]he Accused is alleged to have been a wealthy businessman, a commercial farmer, and a leader of the
Bugurama MRND militia ('Bugurama Interahamwe')").
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however, he was accused of inciting hatred against Tutsis, attacking and killing Tutsis and delivering supplies to the Interahamwe,
the extremist Hutu militia group. 3 He was placed in the custody
of the ICTR in 2004 and was "charged with genocide, or, alternatively, complicity in genocide, and extermination as a crime
against humanity."4
Rwanda's submission to the ICTR was in accordance with
Rule 11 bis ("Rule 11 bis" or "11 bis"), a recent addition to the
Tribunal's Rules of Procedure which allows for the transfer of
ICTR defendants back to national courts.' The provision had
been introduced in 2003, as part of a larger United Nations' effort to bring the work of the Tribunal to a close.6 Under 11 bis, a
case can be referred to any state in which the crime was committed, the defendant was arrested or which has subject-matter jurisdiction and is willing and able to prosecute. 7 Before authorizing
3. See id. (alleging that the accused "delivered weapons," "incited hatred," and "instigated the killing of Tutsis").
4. Id.
5. See Rules of Procedure and Evidence, International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda, Rule 11 bis [hereinafter "Rule 11 bis" or "11 bis"] (providing guidelines for the
transfer of cases from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR") to national jurisdictions). The Rules of Procedure and Evidence ("Rules") were adopted on
June 29, 1995 and have been periodically amended. The most recent version of the
Rules can be found at http://69.94.11.53/ENGLISH/rules/080314/080314.pdf.
6. See Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
("ICTR"), enclosure, in S.C. Res. 1503, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) [hereinafter "ICTR Completion Strategy"].
Within Security Council Resolution 1503, the U.N. urges:
[T]he ICTR to formalize a detailed strategy, modelled on the ICTY Completion Strategy, to transfer cases involving intermediate- and lower-rank accused
to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including Rwanda, in order to allow the ICTR to achieve its objective of completing investigations by
the end of 2004, all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and all of
its work in 2010 ....
Id. at 2.
7. See Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (A).
Rule 11 bis (A) states that:
If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or not the accused is in the
custody of the Tribunal, the President may designate a Trial Chamber which
shall determine whether the case should be referred to the authorities of a
State:
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept
such a case, so that those authorities should forthwith refer the case to the
appropriate court for trial within that State.
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a transfer, the referring bench must first satisfy itself "that the
accused will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that the death penalty will not be imposed or carried
out."8 The first successful referrals occurred in 2007, when the
ICTR transferred two defendants, Wenceslas Munyeshyeka and
Laurent Bucyibaruta, to French courts.9

Following the introduction of Rule 11 bis, Rwanda abolished
the death penalty, established a new legal framework for referred cases, and provided for extensive fair trial guarantees for
transferred defendants.1 ° Satisfied that the country now met the
requirements for referral, the Prosecutor of the ICTR, Mr. Hassan Bubucar Jallow, made the first request for an 11 bis transfer
to Rwanda in 2007.1 As ofJune 2008, five defendants have been
submitted for referral and the Tribunal has rendered decisions
in three of the cases. 12 Thus far, the ICTR has denied all 11 bis
8. Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (C).
9. See Prosecutor v. Wenceslas Munyeshyaka, Case No. ICTR-2005-87-I, Decision on
Prosecutor's Request for Referral of Wenceslas Munyeshyaka's Indictment to France
(Nov. 20, 2007) [hereinafter "Munyeshyaka Decision"] (authorizing 11 bis referral of
Munyeshyaka to French courts); see also Prosecutor v. Laurent Bucyibaruta, Case No.
ICTR-2005-85-l, Decision Relative A la Requete du Procureur Aux Fins de Renvoi de
L'Acte de L'Accusation Contre Laurent Bucyibaruta Aux Autorites Franais (Nov. 20,
2007) [hereinafter "Bucyibaruta Decision"], cited in William A. Schabas, International
Criminal Tribunals:A Review of 2007,6 Nw. U.J. INT'L HUM. RTS. 382, 398 n.63 (authorizing 11 bisreferral of Bucyibaruta to French courts). The ICTR has also tried to transfer
defendant Michael Bagaragaza to Norway, but the referral was denied. See generally Prosecutor v. Michael Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-05-86-ARllbis, Decision on Rule 11 bis
Appeal, 19 (Aug. 30, 2006) (denying 11 bisreferral of Bagaragaza to Norway). Referral to the Netherlands was later approved for Bagaragaza, before the Netherlands withdrew its offer to host the defendant, citing a lack of jurisdiction. See Prosecutor v.
Michael Bagaragaza, Case No. ICTR-2005-86-11bis, Decision on Prosecutor's Request
for Referral of the Indictment to the Kingdom of the Netherlands, at 13 (Apr. 13, 2007)
(authorizing 11 bis referral of Bagaragaza to Netherlands). For more information
about the failed Bagaragaza referral, see generally Lisa Yarwood & Beat Dold, Towards
the End and Beyond: The "Almost" Referral of Bagaragazain Light of the Completion Strategy of

the InternationalCriminal TribunalforRwanda, 6

CHINESE J. INT'L

L. 95 (2007).

10. See Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-RI Ibis, Amicus
Curiae Brief of the Republic of Rwanda in the Matter of an Application for the Referral
of the above case to Rwanda pursuant to Rule 11 bis,
11-33 (Nov. 22, 2007) [hereinafter "Kanyarukiga Rwanda Brief"] (stating that Rwanda has established a new legal
framework for transferred defendants, built additional prisons and abolished the death
penalty). For more on fair trial guarantees within Rwanda, see discussion infta Part II.c.
11. See generally Munyakazi Referral Request, supra note 1.
12. The five defendants are Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Yussuf Munyakazi, Idelphonse
Hategekimana,Jean-Baptise Gatete and Fulgence Kayishema. Decisions have been rendered in the cases of Kanyarukiga, Munyakazi and Hategekimana. Kayishema remains
at large. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Gaspard Kanyarukiga, Case No. ICTR-2002-78-R1 bis,
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requests for Rwanda, expressing concerns about the nation's
13
penalty structure and ability to ensure a fair trial.
This Note will examine decisions from two of the potential
transfer cases, Prosecutorv. Gaspard Kanyarukiga and Prosecutor v.
YussufMunyakazi, and discuss their implications for the ICTR."4
Part I addresses the early history of the ICTR, including the initial criticisms leveled against it and its rocky relationship with
Rwanda. It also examines the introduction of 11 bis and the
changes made by Rwanda to come into compliance with the
Rule's requirements. Part II discusses the referral decisions
themselves. Finally, Part III assesses the different approaches
taken by the two chambers within their respective denials.
Through an examination of the reasons given in each decision,
this Note will highlight the apparent confusion within the ICTR
as to the level of trust which should be afforded to Rwanda. It
ultimately argues that the ICTR must give Rwanda greater leeway
within its 11 bis decisions, both to underscore the Tribunal's own
legitimacy and assist with Rwanda's growth as a nation. It nevertheless recognizes that Rwanda faces certain, potentially insurmountable, problems in guaranteeing a fair trial, problems to
which the ICTR cannot afford to turn a blind eye. Although the
chambers hold out the possibility of a future transfer if their concerns are addressed, there is a very real possibility that Rwanda
cannot fix the highlighted problems. In the face of such an impasse, one is ultimately left questioning whether the ICTR is
promising the impossible.

Decision on Prosecutor's Request for Referral to the Republic of Rwanda, 1 2 n.3 (June
6, 2008) [hereinafter "Kanyarukiga Trial Decision"] (denying the Prosecutor's request
for the referral of the case of Gaspard Kanyarukiga to Rwanda).
13. See, e.g., Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1 (denying the Prosecutor's request for the referral of the case of Munyakazi to Rwanda); see also Kanyarukiga Trial
Decision, supra note 12, 104 (denying the Prosecutor's request for the referral of the
case of Gaspard Kanyarukiga to Rwanda); Prosecutor v. Ildephonse Hategekimana,
Case No. ICTR-00-55B-Rll bis, Decision on Prosecutor's Request for the Referral of the
Case of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda (June 19, 2008) [hereinafter
"Hategekimana Decision"] (denying the Prosecutor's request for the referral of the case
of Ildephonse Hategekimana to Rwanda).
14. As of December 2008, 11 bis decisions have been rendered in three of the five
possible cases: Munyakazi, Kanyarukiga, and Hategekimana. This Note will only address
the decisions in Munyakazi and Kanyarukiga. The Hategekimana decision strongly resembles the Kanyarukiga decision and thus, will be covered under that discussion. See generally Hategekimana Decision, supra note 13.
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I. FROM JUPISDICTIONAL PRIMACY TO POTENTIAL
PARTNER: THE EVOLUTION OF THE ICTR
A. "We are the victims, but we know nothing about what is

happening there:" The Early History of Rwanda and
the ICTR'5
By 1994, tensions between Rwanda's Hutu and Tutsi populations had reached a breaking point. When a plane carrying
Rwanda's president was shot down outside of Kigali on April 6th
1994, the nation erupted in violence. 16 Over the next hundred
days, extremist Hutus led a systematic, nationwide effort to annihilate the country's Tutsis and moderate Hutus. 1 7 By July 1994,
up to one million Rwandans had been killed, including more
than seventy-five percent of the Tutsi population.'" In the aftermath of the violence, Rwanda approached the United Nations
for assistance with the prosecution of those responsible.' 9 The
nation's judicial system had been decimated during the conflict
and the Government requested an international tribunal, similar
to the one created for Yugoslavia the year before.2 °
15. Sharon Lafraniere, Court Convicts 3 in 1994 Genocide Across Rwanda, NEW YORK
TIMES, Dec. 4, 2003, at Al (quoting Bongani C. Majola, a deputy prosecutor at the
ICTR).
16. See Ida L. Bostian, CulturalRelativism in InternationalWar Crimes Prosecutions:The
International Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda, 12 ILSAJ. INT'L & COMP. L. 1, 13 (2005)
(stating that the president's plane crash "sparked the widespread and systematic murder of between 500,000 and 1,000,000 civilians"); see also SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM
FROM HELL: AMERICA IN THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 329-30 (2003) (noting that Rwanda's

president Juvhnal Habyarimana was killed in a plane crash on the evening of April 6,
1994 and that this event sparked widespread violence).
17. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 13 (stating that between 500,000 and 1,000,000
civilians were killed during the genocide); see generally PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO
INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL

RWANDA FRONTISPLATE 4 (1998)

BE KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES: STORIES FROM

(noting that "at least eight hundred thousand people

were killed in just a hundred days").
18. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 13 (stating that "more than seventy-five percent
of Rwandan's ethnic Tutsi population had been slaughtered"); see also Inge Brinkman,
Review: We Wish to Inform you that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families: Storiesfrom
Rwanda, 47 AFRICA TODAY 141, 141 (2000) (stating that "Hutu Rwandans killed about 75
percent of Rwanda's Tutsi population").
19. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 18 (stating that the post genocide Rwandan government pressed the United Nations "for a war crimes tribunal similar to the ICTY'); see
also Christina M. Carroll, An Assessment of the Role and Effectiveness of the International
Criminal Tribunalfor Rwanda and the Rwandan NationalJustice System in Dealing with the
Mass Atrocities of 1994, 18 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163, 175 (2000) (noting that "the Rwandan
government requested the creation of an international tribunal").
20. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 18 (stating that the post genocide Rwandan gov-

2009]

THE FALSE HOPE OF RULE ]] BIS

1619

Although Rwanda had come to the United Nations for help,
it quickly found itself at odds with the Security Council over the
proposed framework for the new court. 21 During the preliminary negotiations, Rwanda voiced four main objections. First, it
disagreed with the suggested temporal jurisdiction of the Tribunal. 22 Under the proposed framework, the Office of the Prosecutor could only try defendants for crimes committed during the
1994 calendar year. 2' Rwanda objected to such a limited time
frame, worried that it would prevent the court from effectively
addressing the planning stages of the genocide.2 4 Secondly,
Rwanda complained about the resources that would be allocated
to the Tribunal, fearing that it would be under funded and understaffed.2 5 Third, Rwanda objected to the proposed location
ernment pressed the United Nations "for a war crimes tribunal similar to the ICTY"); see
also Carroll, supra note 19, at 172 (stating that the Rwandanjudicial system "was in ruins
after the 1994 conflict" and thus, "did not have the human, physical, or financial resources to deal with massive numbers of alleged perpetrators").
21. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that, while Rwanda had initially requested an international court, the nation "objected to a number of the provisions in
the Tribunal's governing statute"); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 175 (noting that
"the Rwandan government expressed some misgivings" about the proposed structure of
the Tribunal).
22. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (stating that Rwanda first "objected because
the ICTR would have jurisdiction only over crimes committed during the 1994 calendar
year"); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 175 (noting that the Rwandan delegation "did
not consider that the temporal jurisdiction of the tribunal was adequate to hold the
orchestrators of the genocide accountable for their actions").
23. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (stating that Rwanda first "objected because
the ICTR would have jurisdiction only over crimes committed during the 1994 calendar
year"); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 175 (noting Rwandan fears that the limited
temporal jurisdiction would prevent the ICTR from "holding individuals responsible for
planning the 1994 genocide and for carrying out trial projects of extermination in the
early 1990s").
24. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that Rwanda was concerned that the
proposed temporal jurisdiction "would prevent the ICTR from fully investigating the
activities that led up to the genocide."); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 175 (noting
Rwandan fears that the limited temporal jurisdiction would prevent the ICTR from
"holding individuals responsible for planning the 1994 genocide and for carrying out
trial projects of extermination in the early 1990s").
25. See Carroll, supra note 19, at 177 (stating that "the Rwandan government also
considered that the resources of the ICTR were ineffective to address such a massive
problem"). Rwanda was particularly concerned about splitting resources with the
United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"),
since the two Tribunals would share an appellate body and chief prosecutor. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (stating that "Rwanda objected that the ICTR would be understaffed and underfunded, with only a handful ofjudges and with the appellate body and
chief prosecutor to be split between the ICTR and the ICTY").
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of the Tribunal in Arusha, Tanzania.2 6 It argued that the court
should, in fact, be situated in Kigali, so that the Rwandan people
would have an opportunity to be actively involved in its proceed-

ings. 27 Finally, Rwanda objected to the proposed prohibition on
the death penalty. 28 At the time of the negotiations, the death
penalty was legal in Rwanda and the nation worried about the
potential for hypocrisy. 29 It complained that the different penalty structures would mean that those most responsible for the
genocide would receive a lesser punishment than their subordinates, who would be tried in Rwanda." °
The nation's objections were, ultimately, ignored and in November 1994, the Security Council voted to establish the ITCR.3 1
Rwanda was, in fact, the only member of the Security Council to
vote against the Tribunal.12 Within Security Council Resolution
955, the ICTR was charged with the task of prosecuting "persons
responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian
law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens
26. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that Rwanda objected to the proposed
location of the ICTR); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 176 (noting that Rwanda "was
concerned about the location of the seat of the ICTR").
27. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that Rwanda was concerned the distance between Arusha and Kigali "would make it more difficult for the Rwandan people
to follow the court's proceedings"); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 176 (noting that
Rwanda wanted the court in Kigali so that it could help promote "accountability and
national reconciliation").
28. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that Rwanda objected to Tribunal's
prohibition on the death penalty); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 177 (noting that the
"Rwandan government disagreed with the penalties in the ICTR statute").
29. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19-20 (noting that, "[b]ecause the Rwandan Penal Code provides for the death penalty, '[t]hose most responsible for the killings'
would not face the death penalty, while lower-level perpetrators tried in the Rwandan
courts might be executed"); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 177 ("Whereas Rwandan
national laws would allow for the death penalty in cases of genocide, the ICTR statute
provides for imprisonment but not for capital punishment.").
30. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19-20 (noting that suspects at the ICTR could
only receive life imprisonment, while lower level perpetrators in Rwanda could face the
death penalty); see also Carroll, supra note 19, at 177 ("[T]he individuals who committed the most serious crimes could get less than life imprisonment in the ICTR while
lower level perpetrators tried in Rwanda could receive the death penalty.").
31. See S.C. Res. 955, 1 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994) (establishing an
international tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for genocide and "other serious
violations of international humanitarian law" committed during the Rwandan genocide).
32. See Bostian, supra note 16, at 19 (noting that "Rwanda was the only member of
the Security Council to vote against the Resolution that created the Tribunal"); see also
Yarwood & Dold, supra note 9, at 113 (noting that "Rwanda cast the only vote in opposition").
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responsible for such violations committed in the territory of
neighbouring States, between 1 January 1994 and 31 December
1994 ....- 3 It was established in Arusha, Tanzania, and given
primacy over local Rwandan courts, thus providing it with the
right to take cases from the national jurisdiction.3 4
Although the GOR and the ICTR have developed a civil
working relationship in the years following the Tribunal's inception, many within the local population remain unconvinced as to
the court's worth and validity. 35 Some, for example, object to
the overall cost of the ICTR. By the end of 2007, the United
Nations spent more than US$1 billion on the Tribunal.3 6 When
divided between the completed cases, this breaks down to approximately thirty million dollars per verdict.3 7 In comparison,
Rwanda's GDP per capita is approximately US$1500 and around
sixty percent of the population lives below the poverty line.3"
Many, therefore, question whether the money could have been
33. S.C. Res. 955, supra note 31, art. 1.
34. See S.C. Res. 955, supra note 31, art. 8(2) ("The International Tribunal for
Rwanda shall have primacy over the national courts of all States.").
35. Rwanda and the ICTR have not, however, always maintained an amicable relationship. In fact, Rwanda cut relations with the ICTR in 1999 after the Appeals Chamber dismissed an indictment against Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza on procedural grounds.
The Government barred the Tribunal Prosecutor, Carla del Ponte, from entering the
country and prevented witnesses from traveling to Arusha. See generally Kigali Protest
Against UN Tribunal, BBC NEWS, Nov. 15, 1999, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/
521807.stm (noting that "the Rwandan Government suspended cooperation with the
International Criminal Tribunal in Arusha and refused to meet chief prosecutor Carla
del Ponte" after Barayagwiza was released). In a later trial, del Ponte noted that "after
[the] decision, there was no co-operation, no collaboration with the office of the Prosecutor. In other words, justice, as dispensed by this Tribunal was paralysed." Prosecutor
v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, Decision: Prosecutor's Request for Review
or Reconsideration,
2 (Mar. 31, 2000) (Nieto-Navia, J., declaration).
36. See MARK A. DRUMBL, ATROCITY, PUNISHMENT AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 131
(2007) (noting that "[b]y the end of 2007, the cost of the ICTR's operations will have
exceeded U.S. $1 billion."); see also Laura Blue, Rwanda's Most Wanted, TIME, Sept. 26,
2007, available at http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,1665648,00.
html (noting that "[iun 13 years, the Tanzania-based international court has spent more
than $1 billion and completed just 33 cases").
37. See DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 131 (noting that the Tribunal has spent "approximately U.S. $30 million" per verdict; this is in contrast to amnesty applications in South
Africa, which cost approximately "U.S. $4,300 per case," and demobilization and reintegration programs in post conflict Mozambique, which cost approximately "U.S. $1,000
per combatant"); see also Blue, supra note 36 (noting that "[i]n 13 years, the Tanzaniabased international court has spent more than $1 billion and completed just 33 cases").
38. See DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 131 (noting that "[t]his is a staggering sum of
money in a country with a per capita economic output of about U.S. $1,500"); Central
Intelligence Agency, The World Factbook- Rwanda (Nov. 20, 2008), available at https://
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better spent on national development or improving Rwanda'sjudicial framework. 39
A second common complaint relates to the inaction of foreign nations at the time of the violence. Many within the population "simply do not see how the international community,
which idly sat by during the genocide, now has the moral legitimacy to punish individual Rwandans as perpetrators."40 They,
ultimately, question whether foreign countries, through the
proxy of the ICTR, have any right to pass judgment on, or get
involved in, Rwanda's affairs.4"
International legal scholars and academics have also criticized the Tribunal. Some, for example, argue that the court favors "the interests of those only morally affected by the violence
over those physically afflicted by it" and in the process, shift the
focus away from Rwanda and its goals.4 2 Critics argue that "international lawyers ...

have largely referred to and replicated their

own legal systems, rather than catered to and built on local realities and needs."43

In his book, Atrocity, Punishment and Interna-

tional Law, Mark Drumbl argues that this tactic "leads to a parawww.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/print/rw.html (noting that sixty
percent of the population lives below the poverty line).
39. See DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 131 (noting that "even just a part of these funds
could have made a huge difference in terms of operationalizing restitutionary or reparative remedies for Rwandans"); see also Jose E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate:
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALEJ. INT' L. 365, 466 (1999) (arguing that "each dollar spent
by the international community on the ICTR is one less dollar available for assistance to
Rwandan courts").
40. DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 130.

41. See id. (noting that most Rwandans "simply do not see how the international
community, which idly sat by during the genocide, now has the moral legitimacy to
punish individual Rwandans as perpetrators"); see also Bostian, supra note 16, at 22
("[G]iven the failure of the international community to prevent or stop the genocide,
as well as the cooperation of some western states with the regime that perpetrated the
genocide, Rwanda would be correct to greet any new offer of western help with skepticism.").
42. DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 132 (arguing that "the main beneficiary of the
ICTR's work arguably has been the international community-whether in terms of assuaging guilt or developing international criminal law-and not Rwandans"); see also
Allison Des Forges & Timothy Longman, Legal Responses to genocide in Rwanda, in My
NEIGHBOR, My ENEmy 49, 56 (Eric Stover & Harvey M. Weinstein eds., 2004) (arguing
that "the trials have been better vehicles for establishing international law than for contributing to the process of rebuilding Rwandan society").
43. DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 123 (quoting Dr. Rama Mani). When Rwanda voted
against the ICTR in 1994, it recognized the potential for such externalization, expressing concern that the ICTR "would only appease the conscience of the international
community rather than respond to the expectations of the Rwandan people and of the
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dox: the society reeling from violence becomes disenfranchised
from the redressing of that violence, which, instead, becomes a
task suited to the technocratic savvy of international lawyers." 44
While such an approach has allowed the work of the Tribunal to
become "more intelligible for faraway audiences," he suggests
that this comes "at the price of intelligibility for those at home
whose neighbors were killers or victims.""' Underlying these
criticisms is the concern that such "externalization" promotes
notions of western paternalism.4 6 By taking charge of the situation, the international community is, in essence, declaring itself
to be a better judge of Rwandan events than Rwandans themselves. 4 7
Whether as a result of the Tribunal's location, its cost, or its
possible paternalism, a clear distance has developed between the
ICTR and the people of Rwanda. In a report on the Tribunal,
researchers for Human Rights Watch concluded that "[m]any
Rwandans felt that the work of the ICTR was far removed from
their daily lives. Respondents complained that the trials were
held far away from Rwanda and were organized using westernstyle judicial practices that place a heavy emphasis on procedure
and have little concern for community interests."4 8 As a result,
many Rwandans have become either ambivalent towards, or
completely estranged from, the Tribunal. 4' For the most part,
the trials in Arusha are inaccessible to those in Kigali and subsevictims of genocide in particular." Yarwood & Dold, supra note 9, at 113 (footnote omitted).
44. DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 135.
45. Id. at 128.
46. See GOUREVITCH, supra note 17, at 252-53 (arguing that "the very existence of
the UN court implied that the Rwandan judiciary was incapable of reaching just verdicts, and seemed to dismiss in advance any trials that Rwanda might hold as beneath
international standards"); see also Alvarez, supra note 39, at 402 (noting that jurisdictional primacy "rests on the presumed greater legitimacy of the international process
over the local and the need to continually buttress this presumption").
47. Bostian, supra note 16, at 22 (arguing that the structure of the court implies
that "the international community is a better judge of Rwandan events than are
Rwandans"); see also Alvarez, supra note 39, at 402 (noting that jurisdictional primacy
.rests on the presumed greater legitimacy of the international process over the local
and the need to continually buttress this presumption").
48. Des Forges & Longman, supra note 42, at 56.
49. See DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 130 ("The Rwandan public remains largely ignorant of, ambivalent to, or at times estranged from the ICTR."); see also Des Forges &
Longman, supra note 42, at 56 (noting that the ICTR has had a limited impact in
Rwanda because "most Rwandans have little knowledge of the tribunal's work").

1624

FORDHAMINTERNATIONAL LAWJOURNAL

[Vol. 32:1614

quently, have minimal impact on the local population.5" As an
ICTR deputy prosecutor noted, "Rwandans say, 'Listen, we are
the victims, but we know nothing about what is happening there.
We don't see it on the papers, we don't hear it on the TV, we
don't hear people in the bars talking about it. So to us, nothing
is happening.""
B. "Clearguidelines around which to structure reform:" The

Introduction of Rule 11

2

biSg

1. Rule 11 bis at the ICTR
In 2003, the possibility emerged for the development of a
new relationship between Rwanda and the ICTR. In an effort to
bring the work of the Tribunal to a close, the Security Council
introduced a "Completion Strategy" for the Court.5 3 The plan
established deadlines for all investigations and trials of first instance.5 4 It also introduced Rule 11 bis, a mechanism which allows for the transfer of cases from the Tribunal to a domestic
court.5 The rule specifically authorizes the referral of a defendant to any state in which the crime was committed or the accused was arrested.5 6 It also permits transfer to a nation that has
50. See DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 130 (arguing that "ICTR trials are by and large
inaccessible and have minimal impact on victims' lives"); see also Des Forges & Longman, supra note 42, at 56 ("In a survey [the authors] conducted in February 2002 in
four Rwandan communities, 87.2 percent of respondents claimed that they were either
not well informed or not at all informed about the tribunal.").
51. Lafraniere, supra note 15, at I (quoting Bongani C. Majola).
52. William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal
Tribunals: The InternationalCriminal Tribunalfor the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of
the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 279, 323 (2008).
53. See ICTR Completion Strategy, supra note 6 (urging the Tribunal to develop a
strategy to transfer cases "to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, including
Rwanda," in order to bring the work of the ICTR to a close).
54. See id. (noting the ICTR's "objective of completing investigations by the end of
2004, all trial activities at first instance by the end of 2008, and all of itswork in 2010").
55. See id. (noting the ICTR's obligations "to transfer cases involving intermediateand lower-rank accused to competent national jurisdictions"). A similar transfer provision, also known as Rule 11 bis, had already been introduced at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). See generally Sarah Williams, ICTY
Referrals to NationalJurisdictions: A Fair Trial or a Fair Price?, 17 CRIM. L.F. 177, 179
(2006); see also Burke-White, supra note 52, at 321-22.
56. See Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (A).
Rule 11 bis (A) states that:
If an indictment has been confirmed, whether or not the accused is in the
custody of the Tribunal, the President may designate a Trial Chamber which
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subject matter jurisdiction and is willing and able to prosecute.
Once jurisdiction is confirmed, Rule 11 bis requires that a referral bench satisfy itself that the accused will both obtain a fair trial
58
within the receiving state and be free from the death penalty.
In contrast to the transfer provision at the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia ("ICTY"), the ICTR rule
does not require the referral bench to consider the gravity of the
crimes charged or the level of responsibility of the accused.5 9
Some ICTR chambers have, however, looked to ICTY precedent
and considered the nature of the defendant and his alleged
crimes within their referral decision.6" Finally, the rule allows
the ICTR to remain involved with the defendants, even after
transfer.6 1 It authorizes the Prosecutor to send monitors and
shall determine whether the case should be referred to the authorities of a
State:
(i) in whose territory the crime was committed; or
(ii) in which the accused was arrested; or
(iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case,
so that those authorities should forthwith refer the case to the appropriate
court for trial within that State.
Id.
57. See Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (A).
58. See Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (C) ("In determining whether to refer the case in
accordance with paragraph (A), the Trial Chamber shall satisfy itself that the accused
will receive a fair trial in the courts of the State concerned and that the death penalty
will not be imposed or carried out."). As noted by Sarah Williams within her article on
ICTY referrals, "[i] t would be inconceivable for the tribunal to be transferring cases to a
judicial system that did not respect international due process standards and international human rights law." Williams, supra note 55, at 189.
59. See Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (C); see also KanyarukigaTrial Decision, supra note
12, 1 6 n.13. For a discussion of the ICTY provision, see Williams, supra note 55, at 18691.
60. Within its decision, the Munyakazi Chamber makes a determination as to
whether the defendant's level of responsibility permitted transfer. It notes that:
According to prior jurisprudence on referrals, "intermediate" and "low-rank"
accused include: a sub-commander of the military police and one of the main
paramilitary leaders in Fo4a; a prison administrator; a commander of a military police battalion including a formation known as "the jokers", four Bosnian Serb authorities involved in a joint criminal enterprise in two detention
camps, a soldier; and a prfet in Rwanda.
Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 10. It concludes that "the Accused had
neither a rank of any military significance, nor had any official political role" and thus,
was an appropriate level for transfer. See id. 11 13-14.
61. See Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (D)(iv) (stating that "the Prosecutor may send
observers to monitor the proceedings in the courts of the State concerned on his or her
behalf); see also Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (F). Rule 11 bis (F) states that:
At any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this Rule and before
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provides the Tribunal with the authority to revoke the case "[a] t
any time after an order has been issued pursuant to this
Rule .... "62
2. "The acceptance of new sets of norms and values:" The
Impact of Rule 11 bis on the Domestic Courts of
Bosnia & Herzegovina and Rwanda63
Within his article on referrals, William Burke-White explains the 11 bis transfer provision in terms of a "carrot-stick"
dynamic.6 4 Through the referral process, the international tribunal is offering the victim nation a "carrot," the chance to try
its own high profile defendants." Before allowing the country
to take control, however, the tribunal requires that it meet certain basic legal thresholds, relating to fair trial guarantees and
the death penalty. If it fails to make the necessary changes, the
tribunal can resort to the "stick:" a denial of transfer or even
revocation to the international court. 66 The prospect of this
"stick" provides the tribunal with a new leverage over the home
state and by extension, the power to directly influence the nation's institutions.6 7 Through the various facets of the transfer
the accused is found guilty or acquitted by a court in the State concerned, the
Trial Chamber may, at the request of the Prosecutor and upon having given to
the authorities of the State concerned the opportunity to be heard, revoke the
order and make a formal request for deferral ....
Id. Rule II bis (G) similarly states that:
Where an order issued pursuant to this Rule is revoked by the Trial Chamber,
it may make a formal request to the State concerned to transfer the accused to
the seat of the Tribunal, and the State shall accede to such a request without
delay in keeping with Article 28 of the Statute. The Trial Chamber or a Judge
may also issue a warrant for the arrest of the accused.
Id.
62. Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (D)(iv); see also Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (F).
63. Burke-White, supra note 52, at 291.
64. See id. at 319-25. Burke does not use this exact terminology within his article,
but does refer to "the ICTY's 'carrot' of a case transfer." See id. at 324.
65. Within his article, Burke-White discusses the ICTY, not the ICTR. His argument is, however, applicable to both. See id.
66. See id. at 300 (noting that where the domestic forum does not meet established
fair trial and human rights standards, "the international forum can assume jurisdiction,
thereby imposing a sanction on domestic authorities in the form of the sovereignty
costs of international intervention"); see also Mohamed M. El Zeidy, From Primacy To
Complementarity And Backwards: (Re)-Visiting Rule 11 Bis Of The Ad Hoc Tibunals, 57 INT'L
& CoMP. L.Q. 403, 405-06 (2008) (noting that the "decision of referral may be revoked
by the Referral Bench if the State fails to conduct proper proceedings").
67. See Burke-White, supra note 52, at 283-85, 295, 323-25 (stating that "the contes-
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process, including "monitoring, sanctioning and socializing," the
international tribunals push "states toward greater compliance
with the legal regime the tribunal enforces by making the costs
of noncompliance greater than they would have been absent the
tribunal or by acculturating states into the acceptance of new
sets of norms and values."

68

Within his article, Burke-White limits his discussion to the
referral process of the ICTY.69 Prior to the introduction of the
ICTY's 11 bis provision, Bosnia & Herzegovina ("BiHl") had little
incentive to pursue genocide cases because the ICTY had jurisdictional primacy and thus, could take any defendant BiH tried
to prosecute.7 ° As a result, the nation saw no reason to evolve or
improve its judicial framework and the domestic court system
floundered.7 1
Rule 11 bis, however, changed the dynamic between the two
parties. Previously, the ICTY could sweep in at any point and
undercut the work of the domestic court. 72 Now, the flow is reversed, with cases leaving The Hague for BiH. By promising that
tation over the appropriate locus of jurisdictional competence provided an international criminal tribunal, which would normally only be able to influence individual behavior, with direct leverage over state conduct and the operation of national institutions"); see also DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 103 (noting that "[t]he ICTY has exerted
considerable influence on the legal systems of the states of the former Yugoslavia").
68. Burke-White, supra note 52, at 291.
69. See id. at 309.
70. See id. at 311 (noting "the ICTY holds primary jurisdiction"); see also Graham T.
Blewitt, The InternationalCriminal Tribunalsfor the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, inJusTICE FOR CRIMES AGAINST HutMANITY 145, 150 (Mark Lattimer & Philippe Sands eds.,

2004) (stating that "[t]he ICTY enjoys jurisdictional primacy vis-A-vis national criminal
jurisdiction systems").
71. See Burke-White, supra note 52, at 314. He argues that:
[T]he subjugation of domestic institutions limited the payoff from investment
in the judiciary for domestic officials. Since domestic courts could only prosecute when international approval was given, the domestic judiciary could not
become an effective, independent institution of governance nor could it be
relied upon to serve its fundamental purpose. In that context, it was far from
an ideal candidate to receive attention or resources from domestic officials.
Id. at 314; see also Paul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role ofJustice in the Former Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebofor Coercive Appeasement?, 35 CASE W. REs. J. IN T'L L. 219, 253-54
(2003) (noting that the Tribunal narrowed "the opportunity for the development of
additional mechanisms of justice, such as domestic prosecutions and truth commissions").
72. See Burke-White, supra note 52, at 311 (noting that the ICTY Prosecutor may
"seek a Request for Deferral from the trial chamber to prevent national proceedings
from continuing"); see also Blewitt, supra note 70, at 150 (noting that the Tribunal can
"take over cases from domestic courts at any stage of the procedure").
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BiH could try its own defendants, with little to no interference
from the ICTY, 11 bis provided the nation with an incentive to
73
change and clear guidelines around which to structure reform.
The transfer of cases has also had a "legitimating effect" on the
receiving nation.

4

As the President of the Bosnian Courts

noted, "[t]hese cases are within our jurisdiction. It is not so
much that we want them, but that we have a right to try them.
And when the ICTY hands them back to us it validates our work
in building [a new legal framework] and expands our credibility."' 75 In response to the introduction of Rule 11 bis, Bil has
introduced a new War Crimes Chamber, provided for appellate
review of transferred cases by the nation's Constitutional Court,
and strengthened fair trial guarantees for defendants.7 6
Following the nation's reforms, the ICTY began to transfer
cases in 2005, starting with Prosecutorv. Stankovic. 7 7 Since then, it
has referred another seven cases, involving twelve defendants, to
73. See Burke-Wrhite, supra note 52, at 323. He notes that:
[R]equirements for referral back provided domestic courts with clear guidelines and targets around which to structure reform efforts, including that the
"accused answer in national courts for all the crimes specified in the
indictments" and that "national trials are conducted in accordance with the international norms for the protection of human rights."
Id. at 323; see also DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 103 (noting that Bosnia & Herzegovina
("BiH") and Kosovo have aligned their "domestic structures to those of the ICTY," shifting their systems to "an adversarial model from what had hitherto been an investigatory/inquisitorial model").
74. Burke-White, supra note 52, at 324 (noting that "the Bosnian government has
pushed strongly to take these cases back, in part because it has recognized this legitimating effect"); see also DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 103 (arguing that a major reason for
reform within "the former Yugoslavia is the reality that, by aligning domestic structures
to those of the ICTY, those domestic structures become better positioned to receive
cases from the ICTY, along with the international support, expertise, and resources").
75. Burke-White, supra note 52, at 324; see also DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 103 (arguing that a major reason for reform within "the former Yugoslavia is the reality that, by
aligning domestic structures to those of the ICTY, those domestic structures become
better positioned to receive cases from the ICTY, along with the international support,
expertise, and resources").
76. See Burke-White, supra note 52, at 337-39 (noting the introduction of the War
Crimes Chamber and that BiH has "embraced international norms and legal rules regarding the prosecution of war crimes"); see also DRUMBL, supra note 36, at 103 (noting
that "[i]n the case of the former Yugoslavia, there is some evidence that these transplants are improving the quality of justice by dissipating ethnic bias and promoting
transparency in the administration ofjustice").
77. See Prosecutor v. Radovan Stankovic, Case No. IT-96-23/2-PT, Decision on Referral of Case under Rule 11 bis(May 17, 2005) (authorizing an 11 bisreferral of
Radovan Stankovic to BiH).
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the domestic jurisdictions of BiH, Croatia and Serbia. 78 Within
her article on ICTY referrals, Sarah Williams even goes so far as
to suggest that "[t]he Referral Bench has effectively adopted a
presumption of referral."7 9 It is important to note, however, that
the situation was not perfect within BiH at the time of these initial transfers.8 " Federal detention centers, for example, were still
in the process of being completed, causing significant concerns
as to where to house transferred defendants.8 ' In addition,
there remained questions as to the funding available for the defense and the skill and training of the domestic personnel involved.8 2 The ICTY, however, appears to have been convinced
that sufficient guarantees were in place to ensure a fair trial and
thus, authorized the transfers.83
Although Burke-White does not address the ICTR within his
article, further support for his theory can be found within
Rwanda. While other nations have expressed a reluctance to accept transferred cases from the ICTR, the Tribunal's Prosecutor,
78. See Press Release, Referral Bench, Milan Lukic and Sredoje Lukic to be Tried
Jointly at the ICTY, MH/MOW/PR1176e (Jul. 20, 2007) ("The Tribunal has to date referred a total of 8 cases involving 13 persons to courts in the former Yugoslavia, mostly
to Bosnia and Herzegovina."). As of November 2008, ten defendants have been transferred to BiH, two to Croatia and one to Serbia. See Completion Strategy of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, enclosured in Letter from the President of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia since 1991, to the President of the Security Council (Nov. 21, 2008),
UN Doc. S/2008/729 (2008) ("Ten Accused have been transferred to the War Crimes
Section of the State Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina, two Accused have been transferred to the authorities of Croatia, and one Accused has been transferred to Serbia for
trial before the domestic courts of these countries.").
79. Williams, supra note 55, at 201.
80. See Burke-WAlhite, supra note 52, at 346 (noting that the new Bosnian court system "is certainly not without its own problems"); see also Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial
Effects of the "Completion Strategies" on the Ad Hoc InternationalCriminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J.
INT'L. L 142, 154 (2005) (noting deficiencies with BiH's witness protection programs,
its infrastructure and its detention facilities).
81. See Burke-White, supra note 52, at 346 (noting that "there are no federal level
detention centers as yet" and "[u]ntil a federal level prison is operational, incarceration
of convicts will remain a significant concern"); see also Mundis, supra note 80, at 154
(noting that the success of 11 bis will require the construction of "adequate detention
facilities").
82. See Burke-White, supra note 52, at 346 ("The skills and training of domestic
personnel are questionable and further training is needed.... [And the] [e]quality of
arms presents a serious concern and . . .it is uncertain whether an adequate defense
can be offered."); see also Mundis, supra note 80, at 154 (noting the need to develop
"effective victim and witness protection programs" in BiH).
83. See generally Burke-White, supra note 52, at 326; Williams, supra note 55, at 179.
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Hassan Bubucar Jallow, has noted that Rwanda "actually resents
transfers to other jurisdictions and considers that its courts are
the natural forum for genocide trials that the International Tribunal will not undertake."8 4 Following the introduction of Rule
11 bis, Rwanda initiated widespread institutional reforms in an
effort to meet the requirements for referral.8 5 First, Rwanda
built two new prison facilities, in accordance with international
standards, to handle any transferred defendants.8 6 On March
16, 2007, Rwanda passed the "Organic Law concerning transfer
of cases to the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and other States" ("Transfer Law").87
As the title suggests, this legislation will govern all defendants
transferred from the ICTR and establishes the legal framework
through which the suspects would be tried.88 It states that all
cases will be heard before Rwanda's High Court and establishes
extensive fair trials rights for defendants, including presumption
of innocence and the right to examine witnesses against them.8 9
It provides for monitoring of both the trials and detention facilities by the ICTR and other international bodies.9" Finally, it de84. Schabas, supra note 9, at 397. See generally Arthur Asiimwe, End of Genocide Tribunal Stirs Emotions in Rwanda, REUTERS, Jan. 27, 2008, available at http://
www.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis/idUSL27658725 (quoting the leader of a genocide survivors' group, who stated that "[t]he only viable solution they have is to send
these fugitives back home").
85. See generally Kanyarukiga Rwanda Brief, supra note 10,
11-33.
86. A special wing was added to a new prison in Mpanga to hold any transferred
defendants convicted in Rwanda. It has seventy-three cells and has been "built to international standards .... Kanyarukiga Rwanda Brief, supra note 10,
28. In addition,
Rwanda has added a custom-built remand facility at the Kigali Central Prison to hold
transferred defendants while they undergo trial. It contains twelve cells and has already
been inspected by the Prosecutor of the ICTR. See id. 29.
87. Organic Law No. 11/2007 of Mar. 16, 2007, Concerning Transfer of Cases of
the Republic of Rwanda from the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda and
from other States, Official Gazette of The Republic of Rwanda, Year 46, Special Issue of
Mar. 19, 2007, p.22, at art. 1, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/
476644652.html [hereinafter "Transfer Law"], (stating that the Transfer Law shall "regulate the transfer of cases and other related matters, from the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda and from other States to the Republic of Rwanda").
88. See Transfer Law, supra note 87, art. 1.
89. See id., art. 2 ("[T]he High Court of the Republic shall be the competent court
to conduct on the first instance the trial of cases transferred to Rwanda as provided by
this organic law."); id., art. 13 (outlining the rights of an accused person, which include: (1) a fair and public hearing, (2) presumption of innocence, (3) speedy trial,
(4) legal representation, (5) the right to examine witnesses against him and (6) to
obtain witnesses on his behalf).
90. See id., art. 19 ("The ICTR Prosecutor shall have the right to designate individ-
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clares that the maximum punishment for any transferred defendant convicted within Rwanda is life imprisonment."5 On July
25, 2007, the GOR passed a second piece of legislation abolishing the death penalty. 2 As mentioned previously, the issue of
punishment had been an early sticking point between Rwanda
and the international community.9 3 The prospect of an 11 bis
referral, however, proved a sufficient incentive for the Government to reexamine its position and prohibit the use of the death
penalty through the passage of Organic Law No. 31/2007."4 As
with BiH, the reforms instituted by Rwanda suggest that 11 bis
has been a catalyst for change and, ultimately, brought the nation into greater compliance with international legal norms and
human rights standards.9 5

uals to observe the progress of cases transferred to Rwanda in accordance with article
11 bis D) iv) of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence."); id., art. 20 ("In the event
that the ICTR revokes an Order of referral of cases it had transferred to Rwanda pursuant to Rule lIbis of the ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence, the accused shall be
promptly surrendered to the ICTR together with any files, documents, exhibits and all
other additional materials as stipulated in the order.").
91. See id., art. 21 ("Life imprisonment shall be the heaviest penalty imposed upon
a convicted person in a case transferred to Rwanda from ICTR.").
92. Organic Law No. 31/2007 of July 3, 2007, Relating to the Abolition of the
Death Penalty, Official Gazette of the Republic of Rwanda, Year 46, Special Issue ofJuly
25, 2007, at art. 3, available at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46badalc2.html
[hereinafter "Death Penalty Law"] ("In all legislative texts in force before the commencement of this Organic Law, the death penalty is substituted by life imprisonment
or life imprisonment with special provisions as provided by this Organic Law.").
93. See supra notes 28-30 and accompanying texts (discussing Rwanda's objection
to the ICTR's prohibition on the death penalty).
94. See Death Penalty Law, supra note 92, art. 3 ("In all legislative texts in force
before the commencement of this Organic Law, the death penalty is substituted by life
imprisonment or life imprisonment with special provisions as provided by this Organic
Law.").
95. This claim is further underscored by Rwanda's actions in the aftermath of the
Munyakazi, Kanyarukiga and Hategekimana decisions. As will be addressed in Part II, the
ICTR based its denials, in part, on concerns that defendants could face solitary confinement if convicted. In response to these decisions, Rwanda immediately passed a law
banning the use of life imprisonment in solitary confinement for defendants transferred from the ICTR. See Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Letter to Rwanda Parliament Regarding the Penalty of Life Imprisonment in Solitary Confinement (Jan. 29,
2009), available at http://www.hrw.org/en/news/2009/O1/29/letter-rwanda-parlia(stating that Rwanda
ment-regarding-penalty-life-impisonment-solitary-confinement
"adopted legislation on December 1, 2008, barring application of the penalty of life
imprisonment in solitary confinement to criminal cases transferred from the ICTR or
from abroad"). For more on the chambers' concerns regarding Rwanda's penalty structure, see discussion infra Part II.b.
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II. 'TOR THESE REASONS, THE CHAMBER: DENIES THE
PROSECUTOR'S REQUEST:" THE 11 BIS DECISIONS96
In recognition of both Rwanda's reforms and the nation's
interest in receiving transferred cases, the ICTR's Office of the
Prosecutor made its first 11 bis referral requests for Rwanda in
2007. This section will examine decisions from two of the potential transfer cases, Prosecutorv. GaspardKanyarukiga and Prosecutor
v. Yussuf Munyakazi.9 v There are two decisions in Munyakazi,
one at the trial level and one at the appellate level. 9a There is
only one decision in Kanyarukiga, reached at the trial level. 99
At the time of the genocide, Gaspard Kanyarukiga was a businessman in the Kigali and Kibuye prefectures and is accused of
planning the massacre of over two thousand Tutsis at the Nyange Catholic Church in Kibuye.'0 He is charged with genocide, or alternatively complicity in genocide, conspiracy to commit genocide and extermination as a crime against humanity.'0 °
As previously mentioned, Yussuf Munyakazi was a wealthy businessman, a commercial farmer and a leader of the Bugurama
Interahamwe militia group during the genocide.1" 2 He is accused
of instigating killings of Tutsis and is charged with genocide, or
complicity in genocide, and extermination as a crime against hu3

manity.

1

0

Both chambers, ultimately, choose to deny the 11 bis re96. Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, at 26.
97. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12; Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra
note 1; Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-RIl bis, Decision on the
Prosecution's Appeal Against Decision on Referral under Rule 11 bis,
8-20 (Oct. 8,
2008) [hereinafter "Munyakazi Appeals Decision"] (denying Prosecutor's 11 bis appeal
for Yussuf Munyakazi).
98. See Munyakazi Appeals Decision, supra note 97; Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra
note 1.
99. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12.
100. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12,
3 ("The focus of the Indictment is an attack against Nyange church on 15 April 1994, where about 2,000 Tutsi
refugees were allegedly killed.").
101. See id. 3 (noting that the Indictment "charges Kanyarukiga with genocide,
or in the alternative complicity in genocide, and extermination as a crime against humanity").
102. See Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 12 ("The Accused is alleged to
have been a wealthy businessman, a commercial farmer, and a leader of the Bugurama
MRND militia ('Bugurama Interahamwe').").
103. See id. 12. The Trial Chamber notes that:
It is alleged that the Accused:
(i) delivered weapons, uniforms and boots to the Interahamwe;
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quests. Each decision, however, adopts a vastly different tone
within its denial. The Munyakazi Bench maintains a distrustful
attitude of Rwanda, while the Kanyarukiga Chamber appears willing, in most instances, to give the nation the benefit of the
doubt. Despite the differences in tone, the decisions base their
respective denials on similar concerns. This section will now address the three primary considerations of each bench: Rwanda's
legal framework, the nation's penalty structure and its ability to
guarantee a fair trial.
A. Rwanda's Legal Framework
Before addressing the merits of an argument for referral,
both chambers must first satisfy themselves that the requesting
state is a "competent national jurisdiction."104 Under Rule 11 bis
(A), a case may be referred to a state "(i) in whose territory the
crime was committed; or (ii) in which the accused was arrested;
or (iii) having jurisdiction and being willing and adequately prepared to accept such a case.' 10 5 Clearly, Rwanda satisfies the requirement under Rule 11 bis (A) (i) and thus, has personal jurisdiction over the two defendants. 10 6 Within the Kanyarukiga decision, however, Human Rights Watch also questioned Rwanda's
subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the nation's legal framework did not appropriately criminalize the defendant's actions.1" 7 While the Chamber would not comment on the specific
(ii) incited hatred against Tutsis at the Hotel Ituze in Kamembe, Cyangugu prefecture;
(iii) instigated the killing of Tutsis at Kabusunzu in Bugarama;
(iv) at Leonard Bamenyayundi's house in Gisuma Commune, Cyangugu
prefecture, planned to kill all the displaced Tutsis gathered at Nyarushishi
Refugee Camp, and was present at Nyarushishi to execute the plan the
following day;
(v) with the Bugurama Interahamwe, attacked Tutsi civilians who had
sought refuge at Cyangugu Cathedral; and
(vi) attacked and killed Tutsi civilians who sought refuge at three parishes
in Cyangugu prefecture, and in Bisesero in Kibuye prefecture.
Id.
6.
104. Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12,
105. Rule 11 bis, supra note 5, (A).
106. See KanyarukigaTrial Decision, supra note 12, 1 9 (finding that "Kanyarukiga's
alleged crimes were committed in Rwanda" and thus, that "Rwandan courts have personal jurisdiction over him"); Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 16 (noting that
Rwanda "has jurisdiction as the State in whose territory the crimes were committed
pursuant to Rule I Ibis (A) (i)").
107. KanyarukigaTrial Decision, supra note 12, 10 ("According to Human Rights
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law that would apply to Kanyarukiga, it was convinced that, between Rwanda's domestic law and international obligations,
there existed a sufficient legal framework to try the defendant
for genocide and crimes against humanity.'0 8
B. Rwanda's Penalty Structure

Once jurisdiction has been established, the chambers must
then satisfy themselves, in accordance with Rule 11 bis (C), "that
the death penalty shall not be imposed or carried out."' 9 In
2007, Rwanda passed the "Death Penalty Law," which states that,
"[li]n all legislative texts in force before the commencement of
this Organic Law, the death penalty is substituted by life imprisonment or life imprisonment with special provisions ....""o
Through reference to this legislation, the Munyakazi Chamber
concludes that the death penalty will not be imposed if the defendant is transferred."' It does, however, express concern
about the alternative punishments available. Article 4 of the
Death Penalty law states that if a defendant is given "life imprisonment with special provisions," "a convicted person is kept in
isolation."' 12 The Chamber, therefore, fears that Munyakazi
could be kept in solitary confinement, a punishment which it
13
argues is in violation of international human rights standards. 3
Watch, transfer may not be possible due to a potential lack of subject matter jurisdiction."). A similar argument was made in the Munyakazi trial. The Chamber did not,
however, address the claim within its decision. See generally Munyakazi Trial decision,
supra note 1; see also Prosecutor v. Yussuf Munyakazi, Case No. ICTR-97-36-RI 1bis, Brief
of Human Rights Watch as Amicus Curiae in Opposition to Rule 11 bisTransfer,
2124 (Mar. 17, 2008) [hereinafter "Munyakazi HRW Brief'] (noting that Rwanda's laws
"may be insufficient to confer rationemateriae, or subject matter,jurisdiction on Rwanda
for the acts alleged in the Munyakazi Indictment").
108. It specifically looked at Rwanda's Transfer Law and Genocide Law. It also
noted that the Genocide Convention and Geneva Conventions were all binding on
Rwanda. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 10-19. Within its decision,
the Chamber also addressed questions as to whether Rwanda was capable of trying
"modes of participation," such as aiding and abetting. It, ultimately, concluded that
Rwandan law provides for the prosecution of alternative forms of responsibility. See id.
21.
109. Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1,
16 n.30.
110. Death Penalty Law, supra note 91, art. 3.
111. See Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 24 ("[T]he Chamber is satisfied
that, in line with Rule llbis (C), the death penalty will not be imposed in Rwanda.").
112. Death Penalty Law, supra note 91, art. 4.
113. See Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 21-22 nn.39, 40 & 41. Within
its discussion, it looks to various sources of international law, including the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
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While both the Office of the Prosecutor and the GOR assure the
Bench that the highest possible penalty is life imprisonment, the
Chamber finds that neither party "satisfactorily responded to the
Defense submission that this means life imprisonment in isolation. " "' The Chamber, ultimately, concludes that Rwanda's
penalty structure, by allowing for solitary confinement, does not
conform to international standards and thus, is a bar to referral.' 15
This issue is addressed again in the Munyakazi Appeals decision."' Following the confusion within the Trial Chamber regarding "life imprisonment with special provisions," the GOR attempted to clarify the applicable law through an amicus curiae
brief' 7 Within its brief, it stated that the Transfer Law trumped
the Death Penalty Law and subsequently, the highest possible
penalty for referred defendants was life imprisonment, not life
imprisonment with special provisions.1 1 8 In addition, the Government attached an official statement to its brief, confirming
that no person transferred from the ICTR could be subject to
solitary confinement. 19 It argued that such a declaration could
be relied upon by Rwanda's High Court, should any confusion
the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, the Convention Against Torture
and statements by the Human Rights Committee. See id.
21-22 nn.39, 40 & 41. The
Chamber argues that solitary confinement could be permissible if certain safeguards
were in place, like a right to review and limits on time in confinement. It concludes,
however, that these safeguards are not in place in Rwanda. See id. 91 30-31.
114. Id. 25 n.48.
115. See id.
32 (finding that the current penalty structure is "not adequate, as
required by the jurisprudence of the ICTY and the Tribunal, thus precluding referral to
Rwanda").
116. See Munyakazi Appeals Decision, supra note 97, 99 8-20.
117. See Munyakazi Rwanda Appellate Brief, supra note 1, 91 9-13 (noting that Article 25 of the Transfer Law trumps the solitary confinement provision of the Death Penalty Law).
118. See id. 1 10 (stating that under the Transfer Law, "[t]he 'heaviest penalty' that
can be imposed is 'life imprisonment' and no more; not life imprisonment with any heavier conditions, such as solitary confinement").
119. See id. (stating that under the Transfer Law, "[t]he 'heaviest penalty' that can
be imposed is 'life imprisonment' and no more; not life imprisonment with any heavier
conditions, such as solitary confinement"); see also id., Annex Three ("Statement of the
Government of Rwanda in respect of sentence for transfer cases") (noting that "[t]he
Government of Rwanda categorically states that the Death Penalty Law does not and
was never intended to amend or to govern the Transfer Law in any respect" and that
"[u]nder the Transfer Law the maximum sentence that can be imposed for such persons is one of life imprisonment and not life imprisonment with any special provisions
including solitary confinement").
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arise over an appropriate punishment.1 20 Finally, Rwanda offered to obtain an official interpretation of the law from its Parliament.' 2 ' This declaration would reaffirm that life imprisonment is the highest possible punishment and be binding on
22

Rwandan courts.1

Within its decision, the Appeals Chamber dismisses these offers. It notes that the official statement is not, in fact, binding on
Rwandan courts and as a result, they would "be free to adopt an
alternative interpretation of these laws.' 23 It also refuses to consider the promised Parliamentary statement, since it has not yet
been obtained.1 24 Instead, the Chamber focuses on the confusion between the Death Penalty and Transfer Laws, finding that
a "genuine ambiguity" exists as to the punishment provision
which would be applied. 125 It argues that a court could rely
upon the Transfer Law, which would mean that the maximum
punishment is life imprisonment.1

26

At the same time, the

Death Penalty Law states that "[a]ll legal provisions contrary to
this Organic Law are hereby repealed."1 27 Since the Death Penalty Law was passed more recently than the Transfer Law, the
Chamber argues that it is possible to view it as lex posterior1 28 and

thus, find that "life imprisonment with special provisions" could
apply.' 29 As with the Trial Bench, the Appeals Chamber, ultimately, concludes that the possibility for solitary confinement
120. See id. 1 11 (noting that the prepared statement can "be relied upon by any
Accused and due account will be taken of it by the Rwandan courts").
121. See id. 1 13 (stating that "an authentic interpretation of the Transfer Law can
be obtained from Parliament stating that solitary confinement.., is not a sentence that
can be imposed in transfer cases").
122. See id. 9 13 (stating that "[s]uch an interpretation is binding on the courts").
18 (arguing that, "[w]hile
123. Munyakazi Appeals Decision, supra note 97,
Rwandan courts may take note of this statement, it is not binding on them").
124. Id. 18 (arguing that "as such an interpretation has not yet been obtained,
the Appeals Chamber cannot take this into consideration").
125. Id. 1 20 (noting that "there is genuine ambiguity about which punishment
provision would apply to transfer cases").
126. Id. 1 16 (arguing that "[i]t would be plausible to construe the Transfer Law,
which states in Article 25 that its provisions shall prevail in the event of inconsistencies
with any other relevant legislation, as the lex specialis for transfer cases, and thus as
prevailing over the more general Abolition of Death Penalty Law").
127. Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 27.
128. Lex posterior derogat priori means that "a later law prevails over an earlier one."
BLACK's Law DICriONARY 931 (8th ed. 2004).

129. See Munyakazi Appeals Decision, supra note 97,

1

17.
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forms a bar to referral. 13 0
Like the Munyakazi Chambers, the Kanyarukiga Bench finds
that the death penalty has been abolished within Rwanda but
again, faces a question regarding "life imprisonment with special
provision. 131 While it notes that the Transfer Law provides for a
maximum of life imprisonment and is the lex specialis13 21 in the
field of referrals, it acknowledges the potential conflict with the

tenets of the Death Penalty Law.1"3 Although the Chamber is
aware that the legislation could be interpreted such that "life imprisonment with special provisions" would not apply, it worries
about the possibility for confusion."' As a result, "the Chamber
finds that there is a risk that Kanyarukiga, if transferred and convicted, may be subject to isolation and is therefore not satisfied
that he will be protected against isolation.1 3 5
In contrast to the Munyakazi Bench, the Kanyarukiga Cham-

ber addresses this issue in relation to the monitoring system and
the potential for revocation.13

6

As previously discussed, 11 bis

(D) (iv) states that the Prosecutor may send monitors on his be130. See id. 1 20 (finding that the Trial Chamber did not err in its conclusion
barring referral because "the possibility exists that Rwandan courts might hold that a
penalty of life imprisonment in isolation would apply to such cases, pursuant to the
Abolition of Death Penalty Law").
131. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 94. The Kanyarukiga Chamber was also asked to address the issues of arbitrary arrest and the potential conditions
within the detention facilities. First, it finds that there is an adequate legal framework
in place to prevent arbitrary arrests. See id. 11 87-88. In addition, it concludes that the
conditions of detention appear satisfactory. It notes that new prisons have been built
and that Rwanda has allowed for monitoring by international bodies, like the International Committee for the Red Cross. See id. 11 91-93. Should any problems arise with
arbitrary arrest or problematic conditions of detention, the Chamber finds that such
issues would come under the purview of the established monitoring system. See id. 11
88, 92-93.
132. Lex specialis refers to the maxim in international law that specific law trumps
general law. For a discussion of the doctrine see Report of the International Law Commission on its Fifty-eighth Session, May 1-June 9, 2006,July 3-Aug. 11 2006, U.N. GAOR,
61st Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 408-10, U.N. Doc. A/61/10, available at http://un.org/ga/
61/documentation/list.shtml.
133. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 96 (noting that, while "these
two laws may be interpreted to the effect that 'life imprisonment with special provision'
does not apply within the field of application of the Transfer Law, the legal situation is
nevertheless unclear").
134. Id. ("[T]he legal situation is nevertheless unclear.").
135. Id.
136. See id. 103 ("The Chamber considers the suggested monitoring system satisfactory and has taken this into account in its deliberations.").
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half to oversee the national proceedings. " 7 Within its decision,
the Kanyarukiga Chamber notes that the Prosecutor has requested assistance with monitoring from the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and establishes that it "has
no reason to doubt that the Commission has the necessary qualifications to monitor trials."13
In addition, it acknowledges
Rwanda's past cooperation with outside bodies, like the International Committee for the Red Cross, and its promise to facilitate
the future work of the monitoring body.13 9
While the Munyakazi Chamber pays little to no attention to
monitoring and revocation, the Kanyarukiga Bench includes it as
a key factor within its decision.14 ° The safety net provided by
monitoring, in fact, allows the Chamber to dismiss some of the
defense's arguments-like concerns about the future funding of
legal aid-and side in favor of Rwanda. t4 1 On the issue of punishment, however, the Chamber finds that the prospect of monitoring cannot "eliminate the risk of solitary confinement in case
'
of life imprisonment."142
As with Munyakazi, the Kanyarukiga

Chamber, ultimately, finds that the penalty structure in place
1 43
forms a bar to referral.
C. Fair Trial Guarantees
The second component of Rule 11 bis (C) requires that a
chamber "satisfy itself that that the accused will receive a fair trial
in the courts of the State concerned . . . .""' While amicus parties, like Human Rights Watch ("HRW"), worry that the defend137. See supra note 61 and accompanying text (discussing the monitoring provision of Rule 11 bis).
138. Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12,
100.
139. See id.
91-93, 101 (noting that Article 23(2) of the Transfer Law "provides
for inspection by the International Red Cross Committee (ICRC) or an observer appointed by the ICTR President").
140. See id. 9 103 (noting that the Chamber has considered the monitoring system
within its deliberations).
141. See id. 103 (noting that the Chamber's view of the monitoring system "has
led to the rejection of some of the objections against transfer").
142. Id. 9 103.
143. See id. 104 (concluding "there is a risk that Kanyarukiga, if convicted to life
imprisonment there, may risk solitary confinement due to unclear legal provisions in
Rwanda"). Since these decisions, Rwanda has passed a law specifically prohibiting the
use of solitary confinement for transferred suspects. See Human Rights Watch, supra
note 95, 1 2.
144. See Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 16 n.30.
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ants will fail to receive a wide variety of fair trial protections, the
chambers focus primarily on two important guarantees: the right
to a free and independent judiciary and the right to call witnesses in one's defense.' 4 5
1. Judicial Independence
In the Munyakazi decision, the Chamber questions the inde'
While it acknowlpendence of the judiciary within Rwanda. 46
edges that the right to an independent tribunal is guaranteed in
theory, it questions whether sufficient safeguards exist to ensure
this right in practice.' 4 7 Much of their suspicion is based on the
past behavior of Rwanda in relation to the genocide trials. The
Chamber, for example, points to the Government's previous
condemnation of foreign judges, who attempted to indict or
prosecute former members of the Rwandan Patriotic Forces
("RPF").' 48 In addition, it recalls Rwanda's decision to bar the
ICTR Prosecutor in 2000, following the successful appeal of
Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza.' 4 9 Given the Government's past willing145. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 91 34-42 (discussing judicial
63-81 (addressing the availability and protection of witnesses);
independence),
33-49 (discussing judicial independence),
Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1,
91 50-66 (addressing the availability and protection of witnesses). The Kanyarukigadecision, in fact, considers a large number of fair trial issues including presumption of
43-45; availability of counsel,
innocence, Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 9191
52-53; legal aid, id. 91 56-58; working
id. 1 54-55; right to an effective defense, id. 9191
conditions for lawyers, id. 91 59-62; and double jeopardy, id. 99 82-83.
146. See Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 40 (arguing that "while Rwandan
legislation enshrines the principle of judicial independence, which by definition includes guarantees against outside pressures, the practice has been somewhat troubling").
147. See id. 1 40 (arguing that "while Rwandan legislation enshrines the principle
of judicial independence ... the practice has been somewhat troubling").
148. The Rwandan Patriotic Force ("RPF") is a political organization formed by
Tutsi refugees during their exile in Uganda. Its armed wing invaded Rwanda during
the genocide and ultimately, defeated the Hutu extremists. It is now the ruling party in
Rwanda and its former military commander, Paul Kagame, is the country's current president. See generally POWER, supra note 16, at 336, 380, 485. In 2006, a French judge
issued a report urging the national prosecutor to issue international arrest warrants
against former RPF members. The Government of Rwanda responded by criticizing the
French government, the judge and his conclusions, declaring that "this criminal attempt to distort history should be dismissed with the contempt it deserves." Munyakazi
Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 44. The decision also recalls an attempt by the Rwandan
parliament to prosecute a Spanish judge for "negationism of genocide," after the judge
issued an indictment against 40 high ranking RPF officers. Id. 1 45.
149. See id. 1 41. Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza was convicted by the ICTR and sentenced to life imprisonment. His conviction was, however, overturned on appeal, after
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ness to question or attack unpopular decisions, the Chamber
fears that the domestic judicial branch will face outside interfer50
ence when it receives referred cases.'
In addition, the Chamber expresses concerns about the
structure of the court itself. 5 ' After a careful examination of the
judicial systems throughout Eastern, Central and Southern Africa, Rwanda created a high court with a single judge. 52 Within
its decision, the Chamber questions this structure, concerned
that a single individual will be more susceptible to outside pressure from the Government. It argues, however, that "this danger
would be substantially reduced if the trial were conducted by a
panel of three or more judges.' 5 3 In light of these concerns,
the Chamber bars referral, concluding that Rwanda cannot guar54
antee judicial independence.
In contrast, both the Munyakazi Appeals decision and the
Kanyarukiga decision find that Rwanda possesses sufficient judicial independence to permit transfer. 1 55 Within its decision, the
Kanyarukiga Chamber emphasizes the extent of the fair trial
guarantees found within the Rwandan Constitution and the
Code of Criminal Procedure. 5 6 While it acknowledges that the
the Appeals Chamber found that his fair trials rights had been violated. See generally
Prosecutor v. Barayagwiza, Case No. ICTR-97-19, Decision, 1 112-13 (Nov. 3, 1999)
(finding that the Appellant was tried on charges for which he was belatedly indicted
and ordering for his immediate release).
150. See Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 40 ("The Chamber is concerned
that these actions by the Rwandan Government ... show a tendency to pressure the
judiciary, a pressure against which a judge sitting alone would be particularly susceptible.").
151. See id. 39 (noting concern that "the trial of the Accused for genocide and
other serious violations of international law in Rwanda by a single judge in the first
instance may violate his right to be tried before an independent tribunal").
152. See id. 1 35. It also noted that capital cases in the High Courts of Kenya,
Tanzania, Uganda, South Africa, Botswana and Zambia were presided over by a single
judge. See id.
153. Id. 49.
154. Id. 49 ("[T]he composition of the High Court does not accord with the
right to be tried by an independent tribunal, and the right to a fair trial, thus precluding referral of this case of Rwanda.").
155. See Munyakazi Appeals Decision, supra note 97, 1 29 (concluding that, "based
on the record before it, no reasonable Trial Chamber would have concluded that there
was sufficient risk of government interference with the Rwandan judiciary to warrant" a
denial); Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12,
42 (concluding that concerns
about judicial independence do not "constitute a sufficient basis to deny transfer to the
judicial bodies under the Transfer Law").
156. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 35. The Chamber discusses
the following articles in the Constitution: 140 (establishing judicial independence and
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"concept of judicial independence is relatively new in Rwanda,"
it finds that the examples of interference provided by the defense do not focus specifically on the High and Supreme Courts,
nor show that the alleged interference was successful.' 5 7
The Chamber also dismisses defense claims relating to the
appointment and composition of the judiciary. 15 It is not, for
example, persuaded by the defense argument that executive involvement in judicial appointments in Rwanda is prejudicial,
noting that this is common practice in many countries and does
not, by itself, suggest that the courts lack independence.1 5 9 The
defense also claims that the judiciary is comprised primarily of
Tutsis and thus, biased against Hutus 6 ' The Court again rejects
this argument, stating that it has not been provided with statistiIt also points to the concal information to support the claim.'
siderable acquittal rate for genocide cases in Rwanda, noting
that "[m] any accused of Hutu origin have been acquitted by the
ordinary courts ... "162
Finally, the Bench addresses Rwanda's single judge system.
Unlike the Munyakazi Trial Chamber, the Kanyarukiga Bench accepts the structure in place, noting that "international legal instruments, including human rights conventions, do not require
that a trial or an appeal has to be heard by a specific number of
judges in order to be fair and independent."' 63 It further states
financial and administrative autonomy); 142 (judges hold office for life); 157 and 158
(Superior Council of the Judiciary is responsible for the appointment, discipline and
35. It also discusses Article 1 of the Code of Criminal
removal of judges). See id.
Procedure, which provides for trials by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal. See id. 9135.
157. Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 9138 ("[A]though some of the
illustrations provided by the amici appear well-founded, they are mostly of a general
nature and do not focus specifically on the High Court or Supreme Court which will
adjudicate cases within the framework of the Transfer Law.").
36-37.
158. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 9191
159. See id. 9136 ("[E]xecutive involvement in connection with judicial appointments exists in many countries. This does not in itself mean that the courts lack independence.").
160. See id. 9137 ("[T]hat there has been a tendency to fill higher positions, also in
the judiciary, with Tutsis and exclude Hums" and that "[tihe implication is that the
courts may be biased, or that judicial proceedings cannot take place in a sufficiently
calm and dispassionate climate.").
161. See id. ("The Chamber has not been provided with any statistical information,
neither generally nor in relation to the ethnicity ofjudges appointed to the High Court
and the Supreme Court.").
162. Id.
163. Id. 9140.
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that "Rwanda has had single judge trials in genocide cases since
2004, and there is no information available that the acquittal
1 64
rate has been lower in such trials."
Similar arguments are made by the Munyakazi Appeals
Chamber, which, ultimately, overturns the lower court's finding
regarding judicial independence.' 6 5 Within its decision, the Appeals Bench openly questions the conclusions of the Trial Chamber, noting that the earlier decision fails to cite concrete examples of domestic interference. 6 6 While it acknowledges the potential danger inherent in allowing a single judge to hear
politically sensitive cases, it questions the Trial Chamber's recommendation for a panel ofjudges, noting that "there is no evidence on the record in this case that single judge trials in
Rwanda, which commenced with judicial reforms in 2004, have
been more susceptible to outside interference or pressure, particularly from the Rwandan Government, than previous trials in16 7
volving panels of judges." '
The Appeals Chamber also criticizes the lower court's focus
on Rwanda's past behavior toward foreign judges and the
ICTR.' 6 8 It questions whether Rwanda's response to foreign indictments is an appropriate indicator of how the Government
would react to unfavorable domestic decisions.' 6 9 It also chas-

tises the Trial Chamber for failing to adequately consider
164. Id. Within its discussion, the Chamber also rejects arguments that the
Rwandan judges lack the necessary competence to try such cases, noting their previous
experience in adjudicating genocide trials. See id. 41.
165. See Munyakazi Appeals Decision, supra note 97,
29, 31 (finding that "no
reasonable Trial Chamber would have concluded that there was sufficient risk of government interference with the Rwandan judiciary to warrant denying the Prosecution's
request to transfer Munyakazi to Rwanda").
166. See id. 11 26, 29 (while the Appeals Chamber acknowledges that the Trial
Bench examined a United States State Department Report on Human Rights Practices
in Rwanda, it concludes that this report provides insufficient support for the Chamber's
findings because it "states only in very general terms that there are constraints on judicial independence").
167. Id. 26.
168. See id.
28 (noting that the ICTR has acquitted five people since the
Barayagwiza Decision and "that Rwanda has not suspended its cooperation with the
Tribunal as a result of these acquittals"). In addition, the Appeals Chamber argued that
the "Trial Chamber did not take into account the continued cooperation of the
Rwandan government with the Tribunal" and that "the reaction of the Rwandan government to foreign indictments does not necessarily indicate how Rwanda would react
to rulings by its own courts[.]" Id.
169. Id. (finding that Rwanda's reaction to "foreign indictments does not necessarily indicate how Rwanda would react to rulings by its own courts, and thus does not
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Rwanda's recent history of cooperation with the Tribunal. 7 ° Finally, the Appeals Bench argues that the Trial Chamber did not
appropriately address the prospect of monitoring and revocation.1" 7 ' As a result of these considerations, the Appeals Chamthe lower court's finding on judicial inber ultimately17 overturns
2
dependence.
2. Witness Availability and Protection
The chambers' second focus is on witness availability and
protection. As both decisions note, a number of witnesses in
past genocide trials have either been killed or faced violence and
harassment because of their testimony.1 7 3 According to a U.S.
State Department report on human rights practices in Rwanda,
between twelve and twenty survivors were killed during 2006,
some as a result of the testimony they gave or intended to
give.' 7 4 Within its amicus, HRW argues that at least eight survivors of the genocide were killed in 2007.175 Furthermore, HRW
documented ten cases involving witnesses before the ICTR who
were arrested, re-arrested or harassed upon their return to
constitute a sufficient reason to find that there is a significant risk of interference by the
government in transfer cases").
170. See id. 1 28 n.74 (specifically noting a statement made by the Prosecutor of
the Tribunal to the United Nations Security Council on June 17, 2008, confirming that
"Rwanda continues to cooperate effectively with the Tribunal"). The Chamber also
notes that the Tribunal has acquitted five persons since Barayagwiza and "that Rwanda
has not suspended its cooperation with the Tribunal as a result of these acquittals." See
id. 28.
171. See id. 1 30 (noting that "the Trial Chamber erred in failing to take into account the availability of monitoring and revocation procedures under Rule 1 bis(D) (iv)
and (F) of the Rules").
172. Id. 31 (stating that "the Appeals Chamber grants this ground of appeal").
The Chamber, nevertheless, upholds the Trial Court's decision, finding that sufficient
problems existed with Rwanda's penalty structure and with the availability and protection of witnesses to warrant a denial. See id. 1 50.
173. See Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 51 (noting the Defense submis]
sion that "[t hose who wish to testify for someone accused of genocide are subjected to
harassment, and, if they persist, risk being subjected to violence and assassination"); see
also Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 63 (noting Defence, International
Criminal Defence Attorneys Association ("ICDAA") and Human Rights Watch arguments that "Defence witnesses in particular face threats and harassment, and witnesses
residing outside Rwanda will be unwilling to testify").
174. Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, U.S. Dep't of State, Country
Reports on Human Rights Practices-Rwanda (2006) (stating that "unidentified individuals
killed between 12 and 20 genocide survivors and injured 32 in attacks during the year").
175. Munyakazi HRW Brief, supra note 107, 1 96 (stating that "[a]t least eight survivors were murdered in 2007").

1644

FORDHAMIN-ERNATIONALLAWJOURNVAL

[Vol. 32:1614

76

Rwanda.1
In an effort to address this problem, Rwanda strengthened
witness protection guarantees within its Transfer Law. Article 14
states that, in cases of referred defendants, the High Court "shall
provide appropriate measures for witnesses and shall have the
power to order protective measures" similar to those set forth in
the ICTR's statute. 17 7 Under the Transfer Law, witnesses have
immunity when traveling within Rwanda and courts have the
178
right, when deemed necessary, to order closed sessions.
Despite these theoretical guarantees, the Munyakazi Chamber is concerned about the actual safeguards in place for witnesses. It, for example, expresses dissatisfaction with Rwanda's
witness protection program, arguing that it is understaffed. 179 It
also worries that potential witnesses will not make use of the service, because it is run through the police and Office of the Prosecution and as a result, is seen as biased and partisan. 80
Within its decision, the Kanyarukiga Chamber provides far
greater leeway to the witness protection program. The Bench,
for example, notes that the service is experienced, having handled approximately nine hundred previous witnesses.' 8 It also
discounts concerns about its financial stability, arguing that "a
mere risk that future funding may not be available is not a sufficient reason to deny transfer."' 18 2 While it acknowledges the past
instances of witness harassment, it concludes that "the large majority of witnesses have testified without such consequences" and
that, in general, witnesses will not "face risks if they testify in
176. Id. 97 ("HRW has documented approximately 10 cases where persons who
testified for the defence before the ICTR were subsequently arrested, re-arrested, subjected to worse conditions of incarceration or otherwise harassed after returning to
Rwanda.").
177. Transfer Law, supra note 86, art. 14; see also Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra
note 12,
65.
178. See Transfer Law, supra note 86, art. 14; see also Kanyarukiga Trial Decision,
supra note 12, 1 65.
179. Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 62 (stating that it has "serious concerns regarding the operation of the Rwandan witness protection program. The Chamber observes that the program is understaffed, employing only 16 individuals to serve
the entire country").
180. See id. 1 62 (questioning "whether Defence witnesses will actually avail themselves of the program, given that the program is administered by the Prosecutor and the
Police").
181. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 67 (observing that "about 900
witnesses have been subject to protection since the service was established").
182. Id.

20091

THE FALSE HOPE OF RULE 11 BIS

1645

transfer proceedings."' 83 Unlike the Munyakazi Bench, the Kanyarukiga Chamber is, once again, willing to rely on the monitoring mechanism, noting that the monitors would have the right
to intervene should any violent incidents occur.'8 4 It does, however, share concerns about the potential witnesses' perception of
the program. Given its official connections, the Chamber worbe unwilling to trust the program
ries that future witnesses will
5
or rely upon its services.11
Both chambers also address Rwanda's history of prosecutions for "genocidal ideology. ' 18 6 In 2003, Rwanda passed the
"Genocide Law" which, among other things, prohibits the negation of genocide."8 7 It also bans "any gross minimalization of the
genocide, any attempt tojustify or approve of genocide, and any
destruction of evidence of the genocide.' 8 8 Within their respective decisions, both chambers express a concern that a broad interpretation of this law could lead to the prosecution of defense
witnesses who deny a defendant's role in the genocide.1 8 9 The
183. Id. 1 69.
184. See id. (noting that "[s]hould incidents occur, it will be for the High Court or
the Supreme Court to initiate investigation, clarify the facts and ensure the necessary
protection" and that "[i]f this is not done, or if the measures taken are insufficient, it
would be a matter for evaluation by the monitoring mechanism").
185. See id. 70 (noting that "the link between the witness protection service and
the police may, in the Rwandan context, reduce the willingness of some potential Defence witnesses to testify" and that "[tihe fact that the national prosecutor's office is
responsible for the protection of all witnesses may also be noted by fearful witnesses").
186. See id. 1 72 (noting that the material provided "indicates that in several instances, the concept [of genocidal ideology] has been given a wide interpretation" and
that "[t]here are examples of persons being too afraid to appear as witnesses for persons who allegedly were innocent."); see also Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1,
61 (noting that "Defence witnesses may fear being accused of 'genocidal ideology"').
187. See Munyakazi HRW Brief, supra note 101, 1 32 (noting that the 2003 law
"prohibits 'any negation of genocide, any gross minimalization of the genocide, an attempt to justify or approve of genocide, and any destruction of evidence of the genocide'").
188. Id.
189. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 71 ("[A)n expansive interpretation and application of the prohibition of 'genocidal ideology' will lead to Defence
witnesses not being willing to testify, as they are afraid of being accused of harbouring
this ideology."); see also Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 61 (noting that "Defence witnesses may fear being accused of 'genocidal ideology'"). Both benches rely
heavily on the information presented by HRW within their respective conclusions. The
Kanyarukiga Chamber, for example, notes HRW's argument that "the concept has been
considered to cover 'a broad spectrum of ideas, expression, and conduct, often including those perceived as being in opposition to the policies of the current government'
and 'questioning the legitimacy of detention of a Hum. .. .'" Kanyarukiga Trial Deci-
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chambers, ultimately, conclude that some Rwandans may have a
legitimate fear of being charged with "genocidal ideology" and
thus, be unwilling to testify for the defense.' 90
Finally, the benches address the potential difficulties in securing testimony from the large number of defense witnesses living overseas. As both decisions note, defendants at the ICTR
rely heavily upon witnesses who have left Rwanda and settled
abroad.' 9 ' While these people may be willing to travel to the
ICTR, many refuse to return to Rwanda. Some of those living
abroad are simply afraid to leave their new homes, worried that
it will hurt their efforts to obtain asylum or new citizenship.1 9 2
Others fear retribution or prosecution if they travel back to
Rwanda.' 9 3 Within its amicus brief, HRW states that it had interviewed over twenty four Rwandans living abroad about their willingness to testify in an 11 bis proceeding in Kigali and that none
were willing to do so."'
Rwanda, in fact, recognized the potential difficulty in convincing its expatriates to return and in Article 14 of the Transfer
Law, provided that "[a]ll witnesses who travel from abroad to
Rwanda to testify in the trial of cases referred from the ICTR
sion, supra note 12, 72 n.104 (quoting HRW); see also Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra
note 1, 61.
190. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 72 (stating that "the Chamber
cannot exclude that some potential Defence witnesses in Rwanda may refrain from testifying because of fear of being accused of harbouring 'genocidal ideology"'); see also
Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 61 (noting that "Defence witnesses may fear
being accused of 'genocidal ideology"').
191. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12,
76 (noting that the Kanyarukiga Defence "states that most of its witnesses are residing abroad" and that "[t]his is
not unusual at the ICTR"); Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 63-64 (noting
that "most Defence witnesses reside outside of Rwanda" and that "[t]he Chamber considers that in the context of Rwanda, this places the Defence in a disadvantageous position with regard to the right to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses").
One defense lawyer interviewed by HRW estimated that ninety percent of his potential
witnesses lived overseas. See Munyakazi HRW Brief, supra note 105,
38.
192. See Munyakazi HRW Brief, supra note 105,
105 ("Even Rwandans otherwise
willing to travel to Rwanda might be reluctant to do so because returning to their home
country could prevent their obtaining asylum or delay their obtaining citizenship in
their countries of residence.").
193. See id. 101 (stating that "defence witnesses have expressed fears of recrimination, arbitrary detention and false charges" and that "[t]hey express these fears for
themselves as well as for their family members").
194. Id. 104 ("HRW questioned some two dozen Rwandans living abroad about
their willingness to travel to Rwanda to testify for the defence in cases transferred under
article 1I bis;, none was willing to do so.").
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shall have immunity from search, seizure, arrest or detention
during their testimony and during their travel to and from the
trials."' 9' For those who remain unwilling to testify in country,
the GOR has 6 also provided for video-link testimony within its
19
courtrooms.
While the chambers acknowledge these theoretical protections, they, nevertheless, conclude that "many Rwandans in the
Diaspora will be afraid to testify in Rwanda. 1 97 In turn, they dismiss the video-link option as overly prejudicial, arguing that a
different weight could be attributed to the prosecution witnesses, who testify in court, than the defense witnesses, who testify via a television. 98 While the Kanyarukiga Chamber is more
willing to excuse problems by relying on the monitoring mechanism, it admits that, in this situation, monitoring can not overcome the potential bias to the prosecution.!99 The chambers,
ultimately, find that the defendants will not "be able to call witnesses residing outside Rwanda to the extent and in a manner
which will ensure a fair trial if [their] case[s] [are] transferred"
and thus, deny referral.2 °°
195. Transfer Law, supra note 86, art. 14.
196. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12,
78 (noting "that witnesses
residing abroad may be heard by video-link conference, and that the necessary facilities
exist in Rwanda"); see also Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 65 (arguing that
"the availability of video-link facilities is not a complete solution to obtaining the testimony of the witnesses residing outside of Rwanda").
197. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 75. The Kanyarukiga Chamber argues that it was persuaded by the anicus curiae briefs of ICDAA, HRW and the
Kanyarukiga Defence. See also Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 59 (noting that
"the Chamber shares the concerns expressed by the Defence, the ICDAA and HRW,
that, under the current conditions in Rwanda, it is likely that [fair trial] rights would
likely be violated").
198. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 80 (arguing that "the hearing
of most Prosecution witnesses in the courtroom while most of the Defence witnesses
either refuse to give evidence or testify by video-link would not be in conformity with"
the principle of equality of arms); Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1,
65 ("[I]f
the majority of Defence witnesses are heard via video-link, while the majority of those
for the Prosecution are heard in person, the right to examine witnesses under the same
conditions, and consequently the principle of equality of arms, is undermined.").
199. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 80 (arguing that there is a
real risk that defence witnesses will either refuse to testify or testify via video-link, "even
if the trial is subject to monitoring").
200. Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 1 81; see also Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 66 (finding that "the Accused's fair trial right to obtain the attendance of, and to examine, Defence witnesses under the same condition as witnesses
called by the Prosecution" cannot be guaranteed in Rwanda).
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D. The Chambers' "ConcludingRemarks"
While both chambers refuse the Prosecutor's 11 bis requests, fearing that the defendants will be subjected to life imprisonment in isolation and will not receive the necessary fair
trial guarantees, each decision attempts to end on a positive
note.2 °1 The Kanyarukiga decision concludes that "the Republic
of Rwanda has made notable progress in improving its judicial
system."2" 2 The Munyakazi decision takes this praise one step
further, noting the "positive steps taken by Rwanda to facilitate
referral" and promising that "if Rwanda continues along this
path, the Tribunal will hopefully be able to refer future cases to
Rwandan courts. 20 3
III. "IF RWANDA CONTINUES ALONG THIS PATH...
20 4
FUTURE OF RULE 11 BIS

:"

THE

A. An Argument for GreaterLeeway
Having outlined the reasons discussed within each decision,
this Note will now assess the different approaches taken by the
Munyakazi and Kanyarukiga Chambers. It, ultimately, comes
down to a difference in tone. Within the Munyakazi Trial decision, the Chamber appears distrustful of Rwanda and unwilling
to grant the nation any flexibility. The Kanyarukiga decision, in
contrast, adopts a much more reasonable tone. It expresses a
greater willingness to rely on the monitoring mechanism and
thus, appears more open to giving Rwanda the benefit of the
doubt on contentious issues.
By adopting such different tones, the two decisions point to
an underlying sense of confusion within the ICTR as to the degree of leeway which should be granted to Rwanda. The ICTR
needs to recognize, however, that it is no longer dealing with the
same country that banned the Tribunal Prosecutor in 2000.
Faced with the prospect of 11 bis referrals, Rwanda has made
201. See Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12,
104 (concluding that "the
Republic of Rwanda has made notable progress in improving its judicial system"); see
also Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1,
67 (noting the "positive steps taken by
Rwanda to facilitate referral" and promising that "if Rwanda continues along this path,
the Tribunal will hopefully be able to refer future cases to Rwandan courts").
202. Kanyarukiga Trial Decision, supra note 12, 9 104.
203. Munyakazi Trial Decision, supra note 1, 1 67.
204. Id.
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significant changes as a nation. Through its widespread reforms,
it has demonstrated a good faith effort to improve its legal structure and guarantee greater rights to defendants.2 °5 It has also
opened itself up to monitoring and established its willingness for
the ICTR, the Red Cross and other international bodies to oversee its progress.20 6
In the face of this good faith effort, it is important that the
ICTR adopt a more reasoned and liberal attitude towards
Rwanda. When one considers the importance of these cases for
improving relations between the Tribunal and Rwanda, for
strengthening domestic institutions and for assisting with national reconciliation, it appears clear that the Kanyarukiga decision is a better approach for the ICTR. The Kanyarukiga Bench
seems to recognize the changes made by Rwanda, willing to give
the nation the benefit of the doubt and rely on future monitoring in those situations where potential trouble could arise.20 7 In
contrast, the Munyakazi Trial Chamber appears suspicious and
even, prejudiced.
The most glaring example of this contrast arises out of the
discussion over judicial independence. While both chambers
share a concern that the "concept of judicial independence is
relatively new in Rwanda," the Kanyarukiga Chamber is satisfied
that the defendant can receive a fair and independent trial. 20 It
205. See supra notes 85-92 and accompanying text. Rwanda's good faith effort has
been further demonstrated in the wake of the Kanyarukiga, Munyakazi and
Hategekimana decisions. In response to the ICTR's complaints regarding the nation's
penalty structure, Rwanda passed a law in December 2008 which prohibited solitary
confinement for suspects transferred from the ICTR. See supra note 95 and accompanying text.
206. See supra note 90 and accompanying text. In addition, it is important to remember that a referral is reversible. Rule 11 bis allows the ICTR to take back any case
which it believes is not experiencing a fair trial or a diligent prosecution. In fact, the
Munyakazi Appeals Chamber chastised the Trial Bench for failing to consider this possibility, noting that "the African Commission on Human and People's Rights ("African
Commission"), which has undertaken to monitor the proceedings in transfer cases...
could inform the Prosecutor and the Chamber of any concerns regarding the independence, impartiality or competence of the Rwandan judiciary." See Munyakazi Appeals
30. For Rwanda, a nation seeking international legitimacy
Decision, supra note 97,
and the chance to become further involved with the genocide prosecutions, revocation
of a case would be the ultimate blow.
207. See supra notes 136-41 and accompanying text (discussing Kanyarukiga case in
relation to monitoring system).
208. See supra notes 156-64 and accompanying text (discussing interference with
the judiciary, fair trial guarantees and Rwanda's single judge system).
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bases it conclusion on fact, noting that "Rwanda has had single
judge trials in genocide cases since 2004, and there is no information available that the acquittal rate has been lower in such
trials. '2°9 When a defense claim is not grounded in research or
backed up by statistics, as seen with the argument relating to an
2 1°
ethnically biased judiciary, the Chamber simply dismisses it.
By better grounding its decision with facts and by allowing room
for monitoring and revocation, the Kanyarukiga Chamber appears as a court should: reasoned, objective and logical.
In contrast, the Munyakazi Bench seems distrustful and
skeptical. The Chamber appears convinced that an independent
tribunal will not be possible within Rwanda and yet, fails to cite
supporting evidence. It argues that there is a strong chance of
executive interference but, as noted by the Appeals Chamber,
"did not refer to any information demonstrating actual interference by the Rwandan government in any cases before the
Rwandan courts.

' 2 11

The closest the Chamber comes to ground-

ing its decision in fact is to recall Rwanda's past behavior toward
the ICTR and foreign judges.2 1 2 As noted by the Appeals Chamber, however, Rwanda's reaction to foreign judges, and particularly those from a nation with which it has a contentious relationship, like France, provides little indication of how it will behave
toward a domestic court.2 1 3 While its past treatment of the ICTR
is more relevant, the event in question, the banning of del
Ponte, still occurred almost a decade ago and prior to the introduction of Rule 11 bis. As the Appeals Chamber notes, and the
Trial Chamber omits, relations between the ICTR and Rwanda
have been amicable since then.2 14

Within its discussion, the Munyakazi Bench also questions
209. See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
210. See supra notes 157-64 and accompanying text (dismissing complaints relating
to interference with the judiciary and Rwanda's single judge system).
211. See supra note 162 and accompanying text. This is particularly damning when
one considers, as the Kanyarukiga Chamber notes, that Rwanda has held single judge
trials since 2004 and there is "no information available that the acquittal rate has been
lower in such trials." See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
212. See supra notes 148-50 and accompanying text (recalling Rwanda's ban on the
ICTR and the nation's past criticism of French and Spanish judges).
213. See supra notes 168-69 and accompanying text (questioning whether the reaction of the Rwandan government to foreign indictments is a true indicator of how it will
behave towards a national court).
214. See supra note 170 and accompanying text (discussing recent cooperation between Rwanda and the ICTR).
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Rwanda's chosen court structure, arguing that a single judge system is too susceptible to outside interference.2 1 5 It does not,
however, ground this conclusion on past examples of interference or point to requirements set forth by international human
rights conventions.21 6 Instead, the Chamber seems to simply
prefer a system of its own choosing.2 1 7
By failing to point to specific examples or rely upon statistics, the Munyakazi Chamber opens itself up to claims that it is
paternalistic and possibly, even prejudiced. Throughout this section of the decision, the underlying message is that there is a
different standard for African nations. It is unlikely, for example, that the ICTR would hesitate to transfer a case to the United
States, irrespective of whether the defendant would be tried
before a single judge. In fact, the ICTR has already transferred
two defendants to France, where their cases will be heard by an
individual judge.21 8 When it comes to Rwanda, however, the
Chamber expects something more. One Rwandan judge is simply not enough. In order for a Rwandan court to be fair and
free from outside interferences, it is necessary for there to be
multiple judges, as though, through sheer numbers, the Africans
may be able to prevail against an interfering government. While
there is some validity to the Bench's underlying concern about
politically sensitive cases in Rwanda, it is lost within the Chamber's distrustful tone. Instead, the Munyakazi Bench sets up a
larger question of whether the United Nations is, ultimately,
holding African countries to a different standard than their Eu2 19
ropean counterparts.
215. See supra notes 151-54 and accompanying text (discussing the susceptibility of

a single judge to outside pressures).
216. See supra notes 163-64, 166-67 and accompanying text (discussing lack of evidence of interference and bias).
217. See supra note 153 and accompanying text (arguing in favor of a panel of
judges).
218. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (discussing Munyeshyaka and Bucyibaruta cases).
219. This is further supported by a general examination of the transfer proceedings in both the ICTR and ICTY. At the ICTR, the Munyakazi Chamber refuses transfer,
appearing to base its decision more on its distrust for Rwanda than factual concerns.
The ICTY, in contrast, faced legitimate problems within its referral states with funding,
a lack of appropriate training and experience amongst potential defense lawyers and a
lack of detention facilities and yet, the ICTY has transferred eight cases to BiH and
Croatia. See supra notes 80-82 and accompanying text (discussing problems with the
infrastructure of BiH).
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B. An Impossible Promise?
Through an examination of the Munyakazi and Kanyarukiga
decisions, this Note has, thus far, argued that the ICTR should
give Rwanda greater benefit of the doubt within the transfer process. There is, however, a limit to the possible leeway which can
be granted by the Tribunal. Within their respective decisions,
both chambers point to undeniable, and potentially insurmountable, problems with Rwanda's referral framework. Their strongest argument lies in the difficulty in obtaining defense witnesses.22 ° Rule 11 bis requires that a defendant be able to receive a fair trial and yet, problems relating to witnesses may
make this impossible.22
As discussed within both cases, witnesses are hesitant to testify in genocide trials in Rwanda, out of fear of harassment, violence or further prosecutions. 222 The chambers note Rwanda's
prior willingness to prosecute perceived "negation" of the genocide and the impact that this may have on a witness' desire to
speak freely. 223 Both decisions also rely heavily on the information presented by HRW, outlining the violence and intimidation
faced by past witnesses.2 24
To make matters worse, many of the witnesses that would be
relied upon by the defense live overseas and are unwilling to return to Rwanda.2 25 The Rwandan Government, in fact, appears
to have recognized this problem and attempted to address the
situation through its Transfer Law. As previously discussed, Article 14 guarantees widespread protections for witnesses, including "immunity from search, seizure, arrest or detention during
their testimony and their travel to and from the trials. 2 26
Rwanda has also made video-link testimony available within the
220. See supra notes 173-200 and accompanying text (discussing witness availability
and protection).
221. See supra notes 173-200 and accompanying text (discussing witness availability
and protection).
222. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text (discussing examples of violence, harassment and persecution of witnesses).
223. See supra notes 186-90 and accompanying text (discussing the possible prosecution of defense witnesses who deny a defendant's role in the genocide).
224. See supra notes 173-76 and accompanying text.
225. One defense lawyer interviewed by Human Rights Watch estimated that
ninety percent of his potential witnesses were living abroad. See supra note 191.
226. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
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2 27

The chambers find, however, that most expatriate
Rwandans continue to be distrustful and unwilling to return, irrespective of the theoretical protections in place. 2 28 Even if
some are persuaded by the new guarantees, others will remain
overseas. There, thus, exists a real potential for the defense to
be at a disadvantage when presenting their cases because they
will be unable to call the witnesses they want. Rwanda's introduction of video-link testimony, while commendable, is insufficient to overcome the potential disparity. As discussed within
both decisions, there is an important difference between live testimony and that conducted over a television. 2 29 The electronic
testimony creates both a real, and imagined, distance between
the witness and the bench. The judges are inherently disconnected from the witness who, in turn, is removed from the pressure of testifying within a courtroom.2"' The live version, in contrast, allows the witness to see the impact of his testimony and
provides the bench with a better opportunity to judge his information and credibility. 2 1 Once again, the possibility arises for
the defendant to be at a disadvantage in presenting his case, thus
preventing a fair trial.2 32 Finally, monitoring and revocation can
do little to assist with the problem. While the presence of the
African Commission convinced the Kanyarukiga Chamber to ignore some potential issues, it can not force witnesses to appear
or remove the underlying bias of video-link testimony.2 3
When confronted with these problems, the ICTR and the
GOR appear to be at an impasse. Both parties want to transfer
cases, either to assist with a "completion strategy" or with national reconciliation. Rwanda has taken the necessary steps to
meet the 11 bis requirements and continues to vociferously declare its right to try these cases. For the ICTR, however, these
227. See supra note 196 and accompanying text (discussing availability of video-link
facilities in Rwanda).
228. See supra note 197 and accompanying text. For details about the threats faced
by possible witnesses, see supra notes 173-76 and accompanying texts.
229. See id. (discussing prejudicial nature of video-link option).
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. See supra note 198-99 and accompanying text (discussing prejudicial nature of
video-link option).
233. See supra note 199 and accompanying text (arguing that monitoring cannot
overcome potential bias to the defendant).
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transfers cannot come at the expense of the defendant's rights.
The Tribunal would lose its legitimacy and fail to achieve its secondary purpose of promoting human rights and the rule of
law.

23 4

The Munyakazi Appeals decision captures the underlying dilemma. Within its amicus curiae brief, the GOR states that "it is
prepared to receive the first transfer case. The structures and
procedures are in place and in many respects have been tested.
The GOR is unquestionably committed to fulfilling its international obligations to deliver justice fairly, mindful that the proceedings will be closely monitored. '235 While the brief notes the
Trial Chamber's praise of the progress made thus far by Rwanda,
it complains that the Bench "did not identify any concrete steps
in respect of the present case that it believed had to be initiated
with a clear strategy and timetable" in order to permit referral.2 36 It further states that "in light of the Security Council's call
for cases to be transferred in appropriate circumstances in accordance with the completion strategy of the ICTR, it is incumbent
on the ICTR in the transfer cases presently under consideration
to address any perceived shortcomings of the national system
with the GOR .... 237 Within its decision, however, the Appeals
Chamber ignored this request for clarity. Like the Trial Chamber below it, the Bench was willing to point to Rwanda's failings
23
but refuses to suggest ways to address these shortcomings. 1
This silence may reflect the ultimate problem for the ICTR:
a lack of viable solutions. Although the Tribunal continues to
hold out the possibility of a transfer, it cannot ignore the
problems inherent in securing a fair trial, like those related to
234. Within a decision on referral at the ICTY, Judge Hunt recognized the underlying issues at stake for the international tribunals, noting that the court "will not be
judged by the number of convictions which it enters, or by the speed with which it
concludes the Completion Strategy which the Security Council has endorsed, but by the
fairness of its trials." Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-AR73.4, Appeal Decision
on Admissibility of Written Statements, 22 (Sept. 30, 2003) (Hunt, J., dissenting); see
also supra note 78 at 156.
235. See Munyakazi Rwanda Appellate Brief, supra note 1, 26.
236. See id.
237. See id.
238. In certain instances, the Appeals Chamber actually went one step further and
actively dismissed the suggestions made by Rwanda to address the ICTR's complaints.
One example of this can be found in regards to the issue of punishment, where the
Bench dismissed the government's promised statements of clarification. See supra notes
123-24 and accompanying text.
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witness participation. While it is important that Rwanda have
the opportunity to try its own high-profile cases, the ICTR cannot give the nation the benefit of the doubt on these fair trial
issues without jeopardizing the full rights of the defendants. A
compromise, however, is not obvious. Unlike the death penalty,
which can simply be abolished through legislation, Rwanda cannot fix a climate and culture of fear through a new law or procedural guarantee. The Government has, in fact, tried to address
this problem through the Transfer Law and yet, potential witnesses continue to be distrustful.
In the face of what appear to be insurmountable problems,
one is forced to question whether the ICTR is, in fact, holding
out the impossible. For years, it has offered Rwanda the dream
of an 11 bis referral and yet, cannot make it a reality without
damaging its own legitimacy and sidestepping international
human rights standards, something which it will clearly be unwilling to do. The referral system is, thus, at an impasse: Rwanda
cannot fix its failings and the ICTR cannot compromise. In the
process, 11 bis has become a cruel joke, a dream dangled before
an eager nation that has little hope of actually becoming reality.
In an effort to bring the Tribunal to a close, one is, ultimately,
left wondering whether the ICTR has promised what it could
never truly deliver.
CONCLUSION
Through an examination of the Kanyarukiga and Munyakazi
decisions, this Note has argued in favor of greater leeway for
Rwanda within the referral process. It noted, however, that the
ICTR cannot always give Rwanda the benefit of the doubt and in
the face of potentially insurmountable problems guaranteeing a
fair trial, asks whether a referral to Rwanda is, in fact, an impossible dream.
While the issues addressed within this Note are specific to
the ICTR, the debate over 11 bis has much larger implications
for the world. Faced with the emergence of new humanitarian
crises, and even genocides, the international community is left
with the question of how best to secure justice for the victims.
Some argue for a truly international approach, as seen with the
ICTR and ICTY. Others look for the local community to play a
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greater role and thus, prefer the "hybrid" system adopted in Sierra Leone and Cambodia.
In theory, the referral system offers a middle ground. In
the aftermath of a genocide, it is not unreasonable to imagine
that a state's judicial framework will be decimated and thus, unable to take a meaningful role in the prosecution of those responsible. Given the circumstances, the best, and quickest, response
may be to set up a purely international tribunal, like the ICTR.
If an 11 bis transfer provision were incorporated from the very
beginning, however, the potential would exist for the country,
once it had regained strength, to begin to take control of the
trials and by extension, its own national reconciliation. Justice
could remain within the grasp of the affected population but, at
the same time, would not have to wait for the country to heal.
Such a proposal cannot, however, become reality until the
current impasse at the Tribunal is addressed. Since the introduction of Rule 11 bis, the ICTR has only referred two cases,
both to France. Such transfers are, however, comparatively simple. France is a western European country and inherently familiar to both the United Nations and the ICTR. The real test for
the Tribunal is with Rwanda. The ICTR must decide whether it
can, in fact, permit transfers to a nation that is inherently "foreign," an African country with a questionable human rights record. Future crises are unlikely to occur in nations like France,
but instead, in countries with which the international community is uncomfortable and unfamiliar. Through a test case, like
Rwanda, the United Nations must determine whether it can permit transfers to a more unconventional target state and if so, on
what terms. If a compromise cannot be reached, however, the
possibility of achieving a middle ground, through the 11 bis referral system, will remain little more than a dream.

